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Abstract
This assignment investigates the bargaining relationship between multinational
corporations (MNCs) and developing countries. The units of analysis of this study in
Global Political Economy are MNCs (non-state actors) and nation-states. In the
contemporary global production structure the 'balance of power' between MNCs and
developing countries has shifted in favour of MNCs. Descriptive secondary sources
were used to illustrate the MNC-State bargaining relationship in telecommunications
privatisation in Sub-Saharan Africa.
In the contemporary global economy nation-states only rarely still compete for territory,
but rather for wealth-creating activities to be located within their borders. Important
changes in the global production structure have resulted in the increased mobility and
economic power of MNCs. These developments have affected the strategic relationship
between MNCs and nation-states and the former have used their advantage to gain
preferential treatment in the bargaining process. The nation-states are also competing
amongst themselves for the investment and technology and knowledge transfers from
these firms. Privatisation programmes in. Sub-Saharan Africa have substantially
increased MNC participation on the continent, which has been historically marginalised
from global foreign direct investment receipts. Research has shown that MNC
participation in infrastructure service provision is more efficient than government
ownership. However, this does not constitute a loss of sovereignty, but rather
emphasises the changing role of nation-states as facilitators of global market relations.
On examination, the distinct bargaining relationship in telecommunications privatisation
clearly illustrates the dependence of Sub-Saharan African countries on technologically
advanced MNCs. Thus, the 'balance of power' has shifted more to MNCs in the global
political economy.
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Opsomming
Hierdie navorsingswerkstuk ondersoek die bedingingsverhouding tussen multinasionale
korporasies (MNKs) en ontwikkelende lande. Die ondersoekeenhede in die studie van
die Globale Politieke Ekonomie is MNKs (nie-staatrolspelers) en regeringstate. In die
huidige globale produksiestruktuur het die mag tussen MNKs en ontwikkelende lande
verander sodat die MNKs nou die magsoorwig het. Beskrywende sekondêre bronne is
gebruik om die MNK-regeringstaat se bedingingsverhouding in telekommunikasie
privatisering in Sub-Sahara Afrika te illustreer.
In die teenswoordige globale ekonomie kompeteer regeringstate selde met mekaar om
territoriale mag, maar oorwegend om welvaartskeppende bedrywe binne hul grense aan
te moedig. Belangrike veranderings in die globale produksiestruktuur het MNKs se
mobiliteit en ekonomiese mag verhoog. Hierdie ontwikkelinge het die strategiese
verhouding tussen MNKs en regeringstate verander. MNKs gebruik hierdie invloed om
voordeel te trek uit regeringstate wat kompeteer vir belegging en die tegnologie- en
kennisoordrag van hierdie korporasies. Privatiseringsprogramme in Sub-Sahara Afrika
het MNK-deelname op die kontinent verhoog, wat histories gemarginaliseer is van
buitelandse direkte belegging. Navorsing dui daarop dat MNKs se deelname in
infrastruktuurdienslewering meer doeltreffend is, as wanneer dit onder staatsbeheer is.
Dit lei egter nie tot 'n verlies aan soewereiniteit nie, maar beklemtoon die regeringstaat
se veranderde rol as fasiliteerder van globale markverhoudinge. Die ondersoek na die
uitsonderlike bedingingsverhouding in die privatisering van telekommunikasie
beklemtoon Sub-Sahara Afrika se afhanklikheid van tegnologies-ontwikkelde MNKs.
Die magsbalans het gevolglik na die MNKs oorskuif in die globale politieke ekonomie.
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1Chapter 1
Aim, Scope and Method
1.1 Background and purpose
Multinational Corporations (MNCs) are supremely powerful international non-state
actors, many of whose annual total annual revenues exceed the Gross Domestic
Products (GDPs) of some nation-states. In attempting to compare the annual total
revenue of selected MNCs with the GDPs of nation-states, it emerges that of the 100
largest economies in the world, 51 are MNCs and only 49 are countries. The following
examples illustrate this phenomenon: the annual total revenue of Wal-Mart exceeds the
GDP of 161; Israel, Poland and Greece, to name a few. The annual total revenue of
. Mitsubishi exceeds that of Indonesia, while Toyota's is larger than Norway's and Ford's
exceeds the GDP of South Africa (Internet 1).
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) by MNCs is one of the factors driving the globalisation
process of the contemporary world economy. MNCs are the dominant element in the
multinational system of production, and are further increasing the size and influencing
the nature of cross-border transactions. Thus, they are playing an ever-more significant
role for developed and developing nations alike (UNCTAD 1997: 1). The process of
globalisation is driven by the interaction of changes in many government policies (the
liberalisation of trade and capital flows), technological developments that reduce
communication and transport costs, and the development of corporate and individual
investment strategies (Internet 2). Investment involves more than monetary transfers
into a host country. FDI is also a major vehicle for technology transfer and the
acquisition of knowledge for the firm as weil as the host nation (Ostry 1995: 129).
The power of MNCs is further illustrated by the UNCTAD (2003) report, which states
that the global stock of FDI owned by approximately 64,000 MNCs, controlling
870,000 of foreign affiliates, increased by 10% in 2002 to an estimated value of USD7
trillion. The value-added production by the foreign affiliates of MNCs is estimated to
account for about 10% of world GDP at a value of USD3.4 trillion. FDI continues to be
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2a more important factor in the delivery of goods and services than trade between
nations. This is illustrated by the fact that global sales by MNCs reached USD18
trillion in 2002, compared to world exports of USD8 trillion in that same year
(UNCTAD 2003: 14).
In terms of its foreign assets about 90 of the world's largest 100 non-financial MNCs
have their headquarters in the Triad (USA, EU and Japan). These MNCs are not part of
the financial services industry. They play an important role in international production,
and in 1999 they accounted for approximately 12% of foreign assets, 16% of sales and
15% of employment (UNCTAD 2001a: 83). In recent years, mergers and acquisitions
(M&As) have played an increasingly predominant role in the flow ofFDI as reflected in
the rush of cross-border corporate take-overs and large-scale privatisation programmes,
occurring throughout the world in the 1990s. In developing countries, however
greenfield projects provide the predominant mode of entry for foreign investors,
followed by MNC participation in privatisation programmes (OECD 2002: 7-9).
Izaguirre (1999: 2) defines a greenfield investment as occurring when "a private entity
or a public-private joint venture builds and operates a new facility".
Due to the potential impact of FDI on an economy, it is important for the nation-state to
act in the country's best interest and regulate the increase of FDI flows by adopting
balanced development-oriented FDI policies. Liberalisation on it own is not enough
and the recipient country needs to put policies in place to maximise the benefits
obtained from FDI, such as upgrading technological and human resource skills,
ensuring local procurement from domestic suppliers, encouraging the reinvestment of
..
profits by MNCs, and protecting consumers as well as the environment (UNCTAD
2003: 18).
The late Susan Strange, was dominant scholar in Britain's International Relations
community and a leading specialist in the modern study of International Political
Economy, argues that too little attention has been paid to the structural changes taking
place in finance, technology, knowledge and politics in the world economy. Many of
the developments in international politics and business are primarily driven by these
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3structural changes. In support of her argument, Strange refers to the rise of the East
Asian newly industrialised countries (NICs) and to the policy transformation of many
authoritarian governments towards a democratic system, not forgetting the advantages
to be gained from an open economy that encourages export promotion. Strange asserts
that the common underlying causes of these structural changes, are due to new
technology of production, changes in the international financial structure and the
lowering of real costs for transnational transport and communication (Strange 1992: 2-
3). These developments have increased FDI flows and competition among MNCs
(Stopford & Strange 1991: 205). In a globalised economy, nation-states wishing to
promote economic activity have to contend with the systemic interdependence between
themselves and finris. This ensuing bargaining relationship (state-firm) constitutes a
new dimension of diplomacy (Strange 1992: 6).
1.2 Problem statement
Susan Strange (Strange 1997: 366) argues that any analysis of international relations
needs to take MNCs into account, because a consideration of the nation-state only as the .
basic unit of such analyses is not sufficient to explain the changing nature of the
international political economy. The explanatory value of International Relations or
Economics in isolation fail to explain properly or to accurately predict outcomes,
because they fail to take into account the highly differentiated conditions of the nation-
state, where social, cultural and political forces often clash with economic imperatives
(Stopford & Strange 1991: 204). Globalisation introduces other actors and forces such
as private firms, new technology and communications (Strange 1997: 366). For this
reason, the field of Global Political Economy is more suited to the study of changes in
the global production structure (Strange 1997: 366; 1995:.7-70).
Questions about the nature of power and who controls it in world terms need to be
studied. When considering the question of power, in the context of the creation of
wealth in the world system, it becomes clear that MNCs play an important role in the
future of global relations (Strange 1988: 23-24). The production structure is defined as
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
4"all the arrangements determining what is produced, by whom and for whom, and by
what method and on what terms". The production structure creates wealth, and
therefore forms the foundation of the global political economy (Strange 1988: 62-63).
The objective of this assignment is to provide evidence that in the contemporary global
political economy the 'balance of power' between MNCs and developing countries has
shifted to MNCs. A qualitative method of inquiry will be used, utilising a case study of
privatisation in Sub-Saharan Africa. At this stage 'the balance of power' will be
defined generally as the capacity of nation-states and MNCs to use their capacities to
influence collective bargaining in their favour.
More specific objectives are to:
(i) describe and use the Stopford & Strange (1991) approach to MNC-state
bargaining;
(ii) discuss how the contemporary global production structure changed to increase the
mobility of MNCs;
(iii) offer an explanation of how MNCs in the contemporary global production
structure have gained more influence (power) in the bargaining dynamics with
nation-states;
(iv) illustrate how MNCs have used this power to bargain successfully with nation-
states by focusing on privatisation in Sub-Saharan Africa.
A study of state-firm bargaining is important for several reasons. This study aims to
add to the current body of literature by illustrating the interaction between global
production and national interests. Without a better understanding of each role player's
goals, structure and processes, our understanding of the sources and uses of power in
international political economy remains inexact. It is, therefore, important for both
ministries of trade and investment, and their counterparts in international business, to
gain a better understanding of the issues involved in glob alised bargaining for market
shares.
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51.3 Methodology
This research assignment is located in the field of Political Economy. The research was
conducted in a qualitative manner consistent with the methodological assumptions of an
inductive design. The author advances the conceptual framework of state-firm
bargaining proposed by Stopford & Strange (1991). Information will be gathered on
privatisation projects in Sub-Saharan Africa, where state-owned enterprises have
relinquished ownership and/or control to foreign MNCs, in order to compare the pattern
emerging from the data with the theoretical framework. This sample was chosen
because it illustrates a distinct state-firm bargaining relationship. The author has an
interest in determining whether the Stopford & Strange (1991) framework can be
simulated for Africa, an area normally margin alised in the context of MNC activity.
Privatisation data from the World Bank Rapid Response Unit's Infrastructure Project
database (http://rru.worldbank.org) and the Investment Promotion Network
(www.ipa.net) from 1990 to 2002 will be used. Particular attention will be given to the
privatisation of the telecommunications monopolies in Africa, because they illustrate
the state-firm bargaining most successfully.
In the compilation of this research secondary information sources have been consulted
from the University of Stellenbosch, US Bellville Business School, Rand Afrikaans
University and the Internet.
A limitation of this research project is that the theory of bargaining between nation-
states and firms is broad and generalised. The nature of foreign private investment is
assumed to be generic with no specific identification of the industry, whether extractive,
manufacturing, or services-based. The figures compiled for privatisation may be
inexact, as privatisation data does not always identify individual MNCs. In many
instances, foreign private participation is reported in aggregate terms of foreign
investors only.
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6There are various delimitations. On the issue of non-state actors, this study will only
focus on MNCs that are private business entities and will exclude the activities and
influence of multilateral institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, World
Bank and World Trade Organisation. The question of how FDI affects the sovereignty
of the nation-state, issues surrounding the convergence of national capitalist models
through economic liberalisation - including trade and investment policy reforms for
export competitiveness, financial stability and the deregulation of the market - will not
be studied. Furthermore, public policy framework issues surrounding the treatment of
foreign firms and the transfer of technology will not be focused on.
In the following sections state-firm bargaining in international political economy will be
discussed using the Stopford & Strange (1991) framework. Chapter Two will focus on
how the contemporary global production structure has changed in important ways,
leading to the increased mobility and influence of MNCs in their relationships with
nation-states. A case study in Chapter Three will illustrate the influence of MNCs in
privatisation in Sub-Saharan Africa. The incidence, determinants and impact of MNC
involvement in previously state-owned enterprises will provide proof that developing
countries have been relinquishing state authority to foreign private firms to assist in
their economic development. In the Conclusion, the proposed research questions will
be revisited.
1.4 Theory and concepts
1.4.1 Stopford and Strange (1991): A framework for MNC-state bargaining
Strange (1988: 18) defines Global Political Economy (GPE) as a focus of inquiry that
seeks to explain the complex interdependence of "social, political and economic
arrangements that affect the global systems of production, exchange and distribution".
These relations result from decisions taken within institutions, governed by rules based
on societal values of "wealth, security, freedom of choice and justice". Power in GPE is
derived from the global production, financial, knowledge and security structures
(Strange 1988: 17, 29-30). The Stopford & Strange framework (1991: 19-23) sets out
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7three new dimensions in the global political economy: . (i) the bargaining among nation-
states for power and influence (state-state bargaining); (ii) the competition among firms
contesting the world market (firm-firm bargaining); and (iii) the specific bargaining
between nation-states and firms for the use of wealth-producing resources (state-finn
bargaining).
Looking at state-firm relations, the global structural changes force the nation-state to
make difficult decisions to satisfy two different constituents, that of satisfying foreign
firms that bring investment on the one hand, and maintaining the support of its domestic
political base on the other. Firms are also caught between two compelling forces, the
structural change of global competition and the difficulty of gaining access to
developing countries (Stopford & Strange 1991: 203).
There have been fundamental changes in the nature of competition 'berween nation-
states. In the past, nation-states competed over territory as a means to create wealth;
now they compete for market shares in the world economy. Natural resources may be
an asset in the competition between nation-states but they are no .longer the sole
determinant of success in international competition (Strange 1995: 55-56). This
economic competition requires nation-states to bargain with foreign firms wishing to
establish their operations within the nation-state, and to prevent national firms from
abandoning their home states and setting up their operations elsewhere (Strange 1992:
6).
The basic premise of the framework is that there is a growing interaction between the
national strategies of nation-states and the global strategies of firms in the achievement
of economic success (Stopford & Strange 1991: 205). The growing interdependence
between nation-states and firms creates a climate of competition within the boundaries
of the nation-state. The magnitude of FDI has grown to the point where the actions of
MNCs directly affect the outcomes of government economic policy. To draw MNCs
into the domestic economy requires supportive policy frameworks to maximise the
advantages of investment. Thus, it becomes evident that MNCs are not secondary to the
study of international relations (Stopford & Strange 1991: 211, 1992: 11).
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8Changes in the international political economy have limited the independent options for
development available to governments. Governments have become directly involved in
the competition to share in the world's wealth by allocating their national resources to
wealth-creating activities. The pursuit of wealth is important for state governance
because internal cohesion and political survival depend on domestic wealth (Stopford &
Strange 1991: 54-56). This shift from foreign policy to industrial policy has made new
forms of collaboration possible between nation-states and firms in the pursuit of world
market shares (Strange 1991: 204; 1992: 7). The transition from "state authority to
market authority" has been mainly driven by nation-states themselves (Strange 1996:
44).
The emergence of the market authority is evidenced by the acts of deregulation and
privatisation undertaken by many countries across the world (Stopford & Strange 1991:
205). Since the end of the Cold War, developing countries' international agendas have
changed, 'because there are now many additional countries from the former Soviet bloc
that are also competing for the same finite pool of international aid, credit and FDI
(Stopford & Strange 1991: 205-206). Furthermore, external policies have been changed
by the fact that investment may have become more significant than trade in promoting
international economic relations (Stopford & Strange 1991: 212). A striking example of
economic change in developing countries is the turnaround on economic policy from
protected home markets to theIiberalisation of trade regimes; import-substitution to
export promotion; state ownership to privatisation; and the initial restrictive actions
against foreign enterprises towards more accommodating policies to attract foreign
capital (Strange 1995: 68). State-owned enterprises (SOEs) became a prominent feature
in developing countries after the 1940s as a means of managing the source of the
economy. SOEs were created for a variety of reasons considered to be important to
national interests, but conflicting objectives contributed to the their ineffectiveness. For
example, targets of output and employment often tend to conflict with targets of
profitability. The internal inefficiencies of SOEs and the need to create new
international business partnerships have led many governments to consider
privatisation, in preference, as a means to promote economic growth (Stopford &
Strange 1991: 121).
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9The objective of privatisation is to increase the economic efficiency of SOEs. Stopford
& Strange (1991: 122) define privatisation as "ranging from the sale of all, or part of the
equity, to the transformation of management through management contracts, or leasing
agreements with foreign private firms". Privatisation is one method of attracting
foreign capital to upgrade the infrastructure of the domestic economy, thus enhancing
the country's capacity to participate in the global economy (Strange 1996: 56, 79).
This definition of privatisation illustrates that firms and nation-states, both acting as
competitors for market shares as a means to wealth and survival, are cooperating to
exercise power over national and international economic development (Stopford &
Strange 1991: 212; Strange 1997: 367). Strange emphasises that nation-states still
maintain ultimate control over their territories; MNCs who seek access to operate in a
country must negotiate with the government for permission (Strange 1997: 368). Each
firm has a particular set of assets it uses to bargain with states, such as technology,
capital and marketing access to major international markets with which it earns foreign
exchange for the host country. Conversely, the nation-state's bargaining position is
determined by its factor endowments found within its borders. However, the firm is
able to create value from these resources through its knowledge of production (Stopford
& Strange 1991: 215; Strange 1992: 7). Refusing access to MNCs will see other nation-
states gaining the market share produced by these firms. Nation-states therefore
compete to have value-added production located in their territories (Strange 1997: 368-
369). Once a firm enters into a foreign market it enters into a political relationship with
both the home and the host governments, as well as with various other stakeholders
such as ministries, organised labour and suppliers (Strange 1995: 59). According to
Stopford & Strange (199 I: 18) MNCs consider the following aspects essential in
evaluating their growth prospects in a country: (i) the availability of natural resources;
(ii) the size of the internal market; (iii) the availability of skilled and economical labour
and; (iv) favourable regulatory environments.
Stopford & Strange (1991: 212) maintain that the relationship between nation-states and
MNCs seems to be characterised by both cooperation and conflict. To be able to
compete for an international market share, nation-states require factors of production to
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be situated within its borders, generally irrespective of who arranges it. Conversely,
MNCs require control over their productive assets, irrespective of where they are
situated. The issue of legal ownership may also be less important to the firm than to the
nation-state. Cooperation is achieved when the nation-state can secure the location of
the firm within its territory and the firm maintains control over its business. Conflict
arises when the firm wishes to locate its operations elsewhere or when the nation-state
interferes with the finn's management of its operations (Stopford & Strange 1991: 211-
212).
In its synopsis, the Stopford & Strange framework (1991) contends that the policy
turnaround by the governments of developing countries to attract MNCs has changed
from the 1970s to the 1990s due to the realisation that MNCs can systematically help or
hinder national economic development. Collectively, governments have lost bargaining
power to MNCs as the possibility of group action by nation-states has decreased due to
intensified economic competition. Consequently, nation-states' bargaining powers have
diminished to a greater extent than that of MNCs. The nature of global competition
requires access to the factors of production and command of the profits and rents to be .
derived from selling on the world markets. Nation-states control access to the land,
including its resources and labour. However, the importance of this ownership has also
declined in relation to the necessity of attracting capital and technology, which the firm
either owns or has better access to than nation-states have. As a result MNCs have
increased their structural power in relation to nation-states in terms of particular
bargaining arrangements, however increased competition may also have eroded their
bargaining strength through the introduction of more competitors (Stopford & Strange
1991: 215-216).
Underhill (2000) develops the Stopford & Strange framework further. He argues that
the concept of nation-states and markets as separate concepts is useful to explain state-
firm bargaining, but that nation-states and firms are not separate entities. In fact,
markets cannot function without the nation-state and the market is structured and
enforced by the nation-state. He proposes that both should be seen as part of a "state-
market condominium". The process of economic integration in global political
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economy is managed simultaneously through economic competition between firms on
the one hand, and the regulatory policy processes of the nation-state's institutions, on
the other. Therefore, corporate strategies are affected by the incentives, constraints and
regulations of nation-states. Likewise, firms are capable of influencing governance and
are able to accomplish public goals.
Underhill (2000: 12) goes on to explain that governance is a function performed not
only by the nation-state, but also by a variety of public and private, state and non-state
institutions and practices. The creation of global markets is made possible by the
nation-state surrendering some degree of governance to these non-state institutions,
while remaining the political authority over its domain. MNCs and other international
organisations cannot exist without the protection of nation-states, and nation-states
cannot meet the challenge of globalisation without these organisations. Therefore, it is
not so much the "retreat of the state" where global economic forces are undermining
state sovereignty, but that the changing role of the state is inextricably linked to the
changing nature of global economic competition.
Scholte (1997: 11) supports this view and argues that the modern nation-state no longer
defends its sovereignty in the traditional definition of a "unilateral state authority", but
that its role has become more modest, viz. "the retention of state influence in a given
area of regulation". Subsequently, the nation-state's power to bargain has decreased,
while the power of the MNCs has increased, because of the changes that have occurred
in the global production structure.
1.4.2 Concepts
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): "FDI occurs when an investor based in one country
(the home country) acquires asset in another country (the host country) with the intent to
manage that asset". The investing firm requires a large enough equity position to secure
control of the asset and its decision-making processes, generally accepted to be above
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10 percent. The issue of control is central to differentiate between FDI and portfolio
capital investment, which includes financial instruments such as stocks and bonds
(Internet 3).
Multinational or Global Corporation (MNC): Firms that expand their whole value
chain across international locations, treating the world as one market or one process
(Internet 4).
Transnational COrporation (TNC): Firms that duplicate parts of their value chain
across international locations, treating the world as different segments of the same
market (Internet 4).
Diplomacy: Diplomacy is not synonymous with foreign policy, which describes the
values and goals of a nation-state's foreign relations with other states. Diplomacy is a
means of communication that involves the exchange of ideas, the representation of
interests and negotiation. Its aim is to "identify common interests and areas of conflict
between parties" (Evans & Newnham 1990: 88-89).
Power: Power relations involve one party with resources soliciting agreement with a
resistant party to achieve a preferred outcome. Such capability can be termed as
positive or negative, i.e. to reward or to punish (Evans & Newnham 1990: 322-323).
According to Strange (1988: 24-30) structural power is the ability to influence the
structures and agendas of the international political economy within which all state and
non-state actors function. Within her paradigm the global political economy is
conceptually constructed out of the production structure, the finance structure, the
knowledge structure and the security structure. Therefore, structural power refers to an
actor's resources and capabilities within the international political economy. In this
assignment power will be' treated as the ability to determine the "rules of the game".
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Privatisation: Privatisation is defined as "the transfer of operational control of an
enterprise from the government to the private sector". It includes "any transaction that
results in the government ceding ownership control by decreasing its equity stake"
(White & Bhatia 1998: 10).
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Chapter 2
MNCs in the Global Production Structure
Introduction
This chapter discusses the development and dynamics of the global production structure
and the changing role of the MNC. It investigates how the global production structure
has changed in important ways to affect the mobility of MNCs, enabling them to locate
across the world, and how these changes have influenced the bargaining relationship
between MNCs and nation-states. Firstly, the structural change in the global production
structure and the impact this has had on MNCs and developing countries is discussed.
This is followed by an examination of the global foreign direct investment trends .
. Finally, the factors that affect the bargaining relationship between MNCs and nation-
states are investigated.
2.1 Structural change in the global production structure
According to Stopford & Strange (1991) the economic imperatives faced by nation-
states and MNCs are driven by changes in the structure of production and financial
markets, which in turn affect the international division of labour. The New
International Division of Labour (NIDL), termed New Forms of Production (NFP) in
the Stopford & Strange framework, is defined as "the sum of institutions and markets
which determine who is going to produce what goods and services, on what terms, and
by what combinations of the four major factors of production: land, labour, capital and
technology". Of these, technology and international finance have the most influence on
structural change (Stopford & Strange 1991: 34).
Wells (1998: 104) contends that the general belief from the 1950s to 1960s was that
import-substitution was the best way to achieve industrialisation and economic growth.
Governments promoted investment in local manufacturing to replace imports, and the
majority of developing countries used tariff and quantitative controls to restrict imports.
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During that time, the Fordist system of production was characterised by mass
production, following the "Taylorist division of labour" that emphasised standardised
assembly line manufacturing using semi-skilled labour. It was based on the
macroeconomic principles that productivity is increased through economies of scale in
manufacturing and that profits are increased through larger manufacturing capacities.
Within this paradigm, it was thought that higher wages for labour would lead to higher
consumerism, which would feed back into the expansion of production facilities and
investment in more cost-effective technologies (Internet 5).
However, this mode of economic development began to be challenged in the 1960s.
Increased competition from firms of the NICs such as Taiwan, South Korea and
Singapore, led to their gaining a competitive advantage, through lower cost production
over firms from industrialised nations, such as the USA and Great Britain, which
usually relied on labour intensive production. Industrialised states could no longer
protect domestic industries against cheap and competitive imports by applying punitive
tariffs and quotes, these being prevented by multilateral agreements such as the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In addition, it became evident that
protectionism led to the inefficient use of economic resources and consequently to
uncompetitive pricing - productivity gains are restricted within the "Taylorist division
of labour". Labour costs had to be decreased and productivity increased through
process technologies (Internet 5). These developments of increasing international
competition, decreasing productivity and increasing wages resulted in firms no longer
being able to rely solely on the home market, but having to expand their operations
internationally and to pursue markets and profits globally. Nation-states realised that
they had to compete with each other to attract FDI to promote economic growth. This
was facilitated by governments giving up control of certain facets of the economy, such
as deregulating their financial and labour markets (Internet 5) .
.Towards the late 1960s a new mode of production began to emerge which has been
referred to as 'Post-Fordism', or 'flexible specialisation'. The focus for global
competition changed from price competitiveness to product innovation. Price
competitiveness was not considered secondary to the aims of firms, but product
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development was now the firm's key to competition, while keeping costs to a minimum.
To meet the aim of product development a multi-skilled labour force is required, as also
the mechanisation of production processes and closer coordination between them
(Kaplin sky 1991: 259-260).
These developments from NIDL to Post-Fordism changed the economic factors that
influenced the location decisions for firms. ' In Fordism, large inventories were held in
case there were any disruptions in production. Post-Fordism introduced the concept of
"just-in-time (JIT) inventory systems", reducing the need for large inventories. This
system required suppliers to be located close to the production process, and dependable
delivery. Greater product flexibility allowed manufacturers to adapt products to
consumer demands, making it necessary to locate production facilities close to the final
market. Accelerated product development and frequent product improvements required
closer cooperation and coordination between firms (i.e. "simultaneous engineering").
There was a transition from the Fordist single-tasking to the Post-Fordist multi-tasking,
which altered the role of labour in the production process. Labour was no longer a cost
to be minimised, but a resource to be maximise (Kaplinsky 1991: 260-261).
The flexibility of Post-Fordism impacted on the optimal scale of production. It impacts
on the on the size óf the product range, the size of the manufacturing plant and the size
of the firm. A single plant could produce a much wider variety of products, resulting in
a decrease in the average manufacturing time. Plant size was also decreasing due to
flexible work practices and the ease with which mechanization technologies could be
adapted, reducing the direct costs of production. However, because firm size is
determined by the large indirect costs of R&D, marketing and organisational capacity-
which can only be recouped against increasing sales - there was still an increase in firm
size. It is therefore important for the firm to maintain operational control over its
production processes and to collect the profits derived from its technological assets
(Kaplinsky 1991: 262-264).
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2.1.1 The impact of structural change on MNC strategy
The MNCs response to dramatic changes in the global political economy was to create
"integrated international production systems", the aim being to create competitive
advantages through the best possible positioning of production processes across the
world by exploiting differences in costs, resources and markets (UNCTAD 2002b: 121).
With different outcomes in different countries and industries, the expansion of
production is driven by three main factors: (i) policy liberalisation, (ii) technological
innovation, and; (iii) increased competition.
Firstly, the policy Iiberalisation undertaken by nation-states, especially in trade and
investment regulations, increases the flow of goods, services and knowledge between
different locations. Secondly, the driving force of rapid technological innovation, with
rising costs and risks, makes it imperative for firms to compete for world markets.
Also, falling costs of transport and communication make it economical to integrate
distant operations and relocate operations across the globe, in search of efficiency
(UNCTAD 200b: 121). Dunning & Narula (1997: 7-8) explain that technology.
improves the coordination of activities situated in different countries. Information' and
computer technologies (ICT) reduce costs of obtaining and distributing information.
MNCs can coordinate their dispersed activities better to respond to the changing
circumstances in the countries in which they operate. There is a benefit of reduced
transaction costs through better coordination within the firm's own network (i.e. "intra-
firm") and also between different firms (i.e. "inter-firm"). Also, new technologies have
shortened product life cycles, increasing the rate at which products are developed,
improved and manufactured. The need to remain competitive increases the cost and
effort of research and development (R&D). Therefore, firms need to recover these costs
by increasing the price per product, improve the efficiency of production processes,
and/or gain a larger market share. Whatever strategy MNCs choose, they will seek to
expand their markets into other countries.
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Thirdly, the previous two driving forces lead to increased competition between MNCs,
who are compelled to increase their efficiency by shifting activities abroad so as to
reach more markets and reduce costs (UNCTAD 2002a: 4). Firms must contest the
same markets as their competitors and exploit competitive advantages wherever they
can (UNCTAD 2002b: 121).
These significant forces in global political economy have changed the corporate
strategies of MNCs in managing their dispersed activities. Given the impact of MNCs
on investment and trade flows, it is important for deyeloping countries to understand the
dynamics ofMNC strategies (UNCTAD 2002b: 121-122).
There are three key elements to MNC strategy, namely: governance, global value chains
and geographic configuration. Firstly, governance refers to the control structure that
coordinates the different geographic and operational units of the MNC. Governance can
take on different forms, ranging from arrangements by which the film retains equity
control (i.e. FDI) to non-equity relationships with external parties. With equity
governance, direct managerial control is maintained through ownership. This method
provides better control and protection of firm-specific advantages (FSAs) such as
technology and brand name. There has been a move towards non-equity arrangements
with external firms such as suppliers, producers and marketers. Such arrangements
include franchising, licensing, subcontracting and management and marketing contracts.
They enable the systematic outsourcing of wider ranges of MNC activities, allowing the
MNC to focus on its core competencies. These trends suggest that technology and
competition have changed the governance structure of firms from internalising control
of all activities towards increased specialisation of those activities in which the firm is
more proficient. Complex global industry structures are created through outsourcing of
non-core activities to independent firms across various locations with the parent
company focusing on its core competencies and managing the diversified production
network (UNCTAD 2002b: 122-123).
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The second element of MNC strategy that affects the global production structure is
referred to as the "global value chain", referring to all those activities that add value to
the production and distribution of a product. This includes the development of
technology (R&D, product and process technology); through to the production phase
(i.e. procurement, production and assembly, testing and packaging); and marketing (i.e.
distribution logistics, sales, advertising, brand management). These functions can all be
segregated and outsoureed to independent firms so that MNCs can focus on their core
competencies. This trend heralds a move away from the "vertical integration" that
characterised MNCs until recently, and which refers to the strategy of integrating more
activities in the value chain, under the direct control of the MNC. As a result, there has
been an increase in the number of manufacturers operating under contract (UNCTAD
2002b: 123).
The third element of corporate strategy is the geographic location and organisation of
production. Here, cost differences govern the decision. Differences in production costs
of one location are appraised in terms of productivity relative to other functions located
elsewhere in the corporate network. MNCs have to be located close to their suppliers
and offset markets in order to increase coordination and reduce costs (UNCTAD 2002b:
124-125).
The activities of firms contesting world markets determine competitive structures.
Firms have three ways of contesting markets. Firstly, exporting is the chosen method
when used when transportation costs are relatively low and the there is an advantage in
creating larger operations in one location, e.g. Boeing. Secondly, the firm may choose
to invest in a foreign country and create a duplicate operation to serve the domestic
market. This way may be taken when the transportation costs and import taxes are high
compared to the cost of the product, such as domestic products, or when there is a need
for local service delivery, such as retail banking. The third alternative is to license or
franchise products, services or trademarks to domestic firms, such as Coca-Cola.
Factors determining afirm's chosen method of contesting markets across nation-states
include the size of the domestic market, regulations and the existence of competitors
and suppliers in that market (Stopford & Strange 1991: 66-67).
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Stopford & Strange (1991: 70-71) point out that the search for new markets and
resources has several advantages for MNCs. Firstly, it allows for more control of
activities in different countries, resulting in more profitability and efficiency than
relying on arms-length market forces. This is common when taking advantage of a
technical innovation or brand name, the products being exported at the outset and local
subsidiaries is established later to ensure suitable control as the market develops. This
is especially important when there is a need to guarantee the quality and reliability of
the product. Secondly, the establishment of new markets allows MNCs to "exploit the
advantages of scale". Capital-intensive industries can attain significant cost savings by
running in fewer but larger plants and exporting to other markets. The advantages of
scale also afford benefits when the costs of developing products or processes are high
(Stopford & Strange: 1991: 70-71). Firms with "economies of scope" have the
advantage of being able to identify opportunities faster than domestic firms and build
networks of supply that combine the strengths of various locations and so further reduce
the total cost of supply (Stopford & Strange: 1991: 78-79). Therefore, the pursuit of
new markets and resources allow MNCs to spread the risk of inconsistent demand and
to lower costs by diversifying sources of supply and markets. Market-seeking investors
may wish to lessen the risk of uneven demand by operating in several markets.
Likewise, resource-seeking investors may also wish to reduce uncertainty in supply by
relying on suppliers from different countries (Stopford & Strange 1991: 71) .
. 2.1.2 The impact of structural change on developing countries
As the international division of labour (i.e. NFP) developed, the power of MNCs to
move away from the factor costs of a national location was increased and the
advantages of global scope reinforced. At the same time, the notions of comparative
advantages between nation-states were also challenged. Anticipating future sources of
advantage is important to successful negotiations between nation-states and MNCs
(Stopford & Strange 1991: 66). A conflicting element is introduced by the mobility of
the factors of production, due to the transportable resources of MNCs and the mainly
stationary labour base of an economy, which affects .t~<?appeal of nation-states for
potential investors (Stopford & Strange 1991: 34).
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The NFP has some advantages and disadvantages for developing countries, bearing in
mind that new technologies serve as barriers of entry to firms from developing
countries. As the costs of NFP increase, many firms must choose between markets
primary to their performance and those that are secondary to them. Due to the high cost
of innovation, patent holders may choose not to make new technologies available to
keep their options open. Developing countries have no options but to negotiate with the
patent holders to acquire access to newer technologies (Stopford & Strange 1991: 38).
Although most developing countries failed to develop the required skilled resource base
and infrastructure, Information and Computer Technologies (ICT) created some benefits
for them amongst which are: easily accessible information about policies, inducements
and procedures; developing countries are enabled to compete more successfully for
investment. Further, ICT facilitates better organisation of production within countries
(Dunning & Narula 1997: 8)
2.2 Foreign Direct Investment
The growth of international production is encouraged by ongoing market liberalisation.
The primary rules and regulations of an FDI framework set out the administration of the
terms of entry and treatment of foreign investors, as well as the operation of the
markets. Other policies that apply to trade and privatisation influence the effectiveness
of core FDI polices, because they affect the foreign investors' location decisions. Once
an enabling FDI policy framework is in place, economic factors assert themselves as
location determinants for MNCs (UNCTAD 1998: 27-28).
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2.2.1 Trends in foreign direct investment
Dunning and Narula (1997: 2, 7) argued that many developing countries have tried to
improve their strategies to attract more FDI, but lack sufficient development of their
"human and technological infrastructure, macro-economic policies and institutional
frameworks". Consequently, FDI has remained largely concentrated in the developed
countries. The failure by developing countries to attract FDI can be ascribed to three
factors: firstly, there has been a reorganisation in the way in which MNCs manage their
international operations; secondly, there has been a change in the type of location-
specific resources that MNCs seek, and lastly, the nation-states' expectations of MNCs'
contributions has changed. Table 2.1 shows that many governments, faced with ever
decreasing FDI inflows, increased the liberalisation of FDI regimes to increase FDI
inflows.
Table 2.1: Changes in national regulations of FDI, 1991-2002
Item 1991 1992 1993 J9!):J 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2(0) 2001 2002
NuniJer of countries that intredeeed changes in 35 43 57 49 M 6S 76 (jj 63 (:f) 71 70
their invest:rrent regirres
N.nrlJer of regulatory changes of \\hich: 82 79 102 110 112 114 151 145 140 150 200 248
Mre favournble to FDI 80 79 101 100 HXi 98 135 136 131 147 194 236
Less favournble to ID 2 0 2 6 16 16 9 9 3 14 12
(Source: UNCTAD 2003: 13)
Table 2.2 below provides a summary of the host country determinants that attract FDI
from MNCs. Also, the FDI strategies by MNCs can be classified according to market-
seeking, resource-seeking or efficiency-seeking motives.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Table 2.2: The MNC and host country determinants of FDI
Host country determinants I I Type of FDI classified by1motives of MNC Principal economic determinantsin host countries
A. Market-seeking
B. Resource/
asset-seeking
C. Efficiency-seeking
• Market size and per capita income
• Market growth
• Access to regional and global markets
• Country-specific consumer preferences
• Structure of markets
• Raw materials
• Low-cost unskilled labour
• Skilled labour
• Technological, innovatory assets as embodied in
individuals, firms and clusters
• Physical infrastructure (ports, roads, power,
telecommunications)
• Cost of resources and assets listed under B,
adjusted for productivity of labour resources
• Other inputs costs, i.e. transport and
communication costs to/from and within host
economy and costs of other intermediate
products
• Membership of a regional integration agreement
conducive to the establishment of regional
corporate networks.
N
W
I. Policy framework for FDI
• Economic, political and stability
• Rules regarding entry and operations
• Standards of treatment of foreign affiliates
• Policies on functioning and structure of markets
• International agreements on FDI
• Privatisation policy
• Trade tariffs and coherence of FDI
and trade policies
• Tax policy
II. Economic determinants
III. Business facilitation
• Investment promotion (including image-building and
generating-generating activities and services)
• Hassle costs (related to corruption and administrative
efficiency)
• Social amenities (quality of life, etc)
• Investment incentives
• After-investment services
(Source: UNCTAD 1998: 91)
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Balaam & Veseth (1996: 341, 353) hold that FOI activity is concentrated mainly in the
developed countries. It is estimated that 95% of FOI originates from the developed
countries, and 80% of that is directed at other developed economies. The reason for this
is that developed nations have large domestic markets, modem infrastructures, large
pools of educated workers, stable political environments and that they rarely impose
restrictions on the activities of MNCs. Historically, 70% of outbound FOI from Triad
countries (USA, European Union and Japan) is directed at the Triad. The increase in
FDI flows to developing countries is directed mostly at a small group of countries,
primarily NICs and China (Dunning & Narula 1997: 5). Table 2.3 below illustrates the
increase in global FDI inward stock from 1980 to 2000. It can be seen that FOI receipts
for the developed countries far exceed developing countries. Also, the Latin American
and Caribbean as well as the Asia and Pacific regions have successfully increased their
FDI receipts, while Africa remains largely excluded.
Table 2.3: Foreign Direct Investment inward stock by host region, 1980-2000
7,000
-+-World
6,000 ___ Developed Countries
......_ Developing Countries
5,000 ___ Africa
ê 4,000 ~ Latin America and Carribeani --- Asia and Pac IOC
~ 3,000 ---+-- Central and Eastern Europe
2,000
1,000
0
1980 1985 1990 1995 1999 2000
(Source: Adapted from Akinkugbe 2003: 4)
2.2.2 Foreign direct investment in Africa
Research has shown that MNCs are interested mainly in large and growing markets to
expand their operations. African economies are mostly small with poor projections for
growth. Only a few countries with a wealth of resources have been able to increase
their FDI receipts in recent years (Gold 1994: 144). The main reason for this poor
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performance can be ascribed to political and economic instability, poor legal systems
for enforcing commercial contracts, security threats to property and personnel, poor
public services and closed trade regimes (OECD 2002: 8). Other factors often cited are
inadequate infrastructure and human capital, low rates of return on investments, a
chronic shortage of foreign exchange, overvalued exchange rates, huge domestic and
external debt burdens, and inefficient financial sectors on which to raise capital for
investment (UN 1995: 4-6).
During the last decade some countries like South Africa, Botswana, Equatorial Guinea,
Ghana, Mozambique, Namibia, Tunisia and Uganda have outperformed other African
countries. This has been due to the improvement of regulatory FDI frameworks as well
as macroeconomic and political stability, fast-growing national markets, access to large
regional markets and significant privatisation programmes (UNCTAD 1998: 23).
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has put out an
Inward Performance Index, which compares the ratio of a country's share in global FDI
to its share in global Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This index value implies that a
country's share of global FDI is equal to that country's share of world GDP and this
measure can be used to indicate MNC activity in the domestic economy. An index
value higher than one attracts more FDI than may be expected on the basis of its GDP.
This ratio has increased markedly for developing countries, which export manufactured
goods (Dunning & Narula 1997: 5). An increase in FDI to some developing countries
may partly be in response to privatisation programmes undertaken as part of IMF
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs)! (Dunning & Narula 1997: 6-7).
In terms of changes over the past decade, Africa experienced a fall in its score (from 0.8
during 1988-1990 to 0.5 during 1998-2000), while Latin America improved
significantly from 0.9 to 1.4.. The EU, USA, and East and South scored much higher
than one and even the emerging Central and Eastern Europe scored close to one. On
average, Africa's share of developing countries inflows has more than halved from 1986
1 The aims of a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) are to restore financial credibility to an
overstretched public sector and to create an enabling environment for accelerated economic growth.
SAPs include limits on public sector spending, adjustments to foreign exchange and real interests rates,
reducing factor and price controls and the reform of state-owned enterprises (Internet 6).
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to 1990 and 1991 to 1996 (UNCTAD 1997: 16). Although Africa has historically
received less than 5% of global FDI, compared to its economic size, the amount of FDI
to Africa was similar to that received by the other developing countries (UNCTAD
2002a: 7).
Table 2.4 illustrates the FDI inward stock as a percentage of GDP for four developing
country regions: Africa; Latin America and the Caribbean; Asia and the Pacific; and
Central and Eastern Europe. Although Table 2.3 showed Africa's marginal FDI receipts
in US dollar amounts compared to the Latin American and Caribbean, and Asian and
Pacific countries, this ratio illustrates that relative to GDP size, Africa has been more or
less equally successful in attracting FDI. The difference in value terms can be ascribed
to Africa's small and underdeveloped markets, and therefore smaller GDPs and less
FDI.
Table 2.4: FDI inward stock as a percentage of GDP, 1980-2002
50
45
40
35
• Africa
CJ Latin America& Caribbean1-------------1
!ii] Asia& Pacific
CJ Central & Eastem Europe
I3025+-----------------20+-----~1-------~---
15
10
5
o
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002
(Source: UNCTAD 200lb: 280-286)
2.2.3 Trends in Privatisation
According to the OECD, the period from 1990 to 2000 saw an extraordinary amount of
privatisation taking place globally, exceeding USD900 billion. The main motivation for
privatisation by nation-states is to reduce the range of activities of the government in
cases where it has become inefficient and consumes too many resources. The private
sector is then invited to operate those enterprises more efficiently. Privatisation benefits
the government, SOEs, the private sector, consumers and the foreign investors, if the
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process is implemented and managed properly. SOEs are reformed through the
introduction of new technologies, better management, and improved training of
personnel that reduces costs and improves the efficiency of the operations. Government
benefits by no longer being required to subsidise the privatised SOEs, and revenues are
earned from the sales of SOEs. The new sources of investment capital introduced by
privatisation are important in several ways: in many developing countries, sufficient
capital for infrastructure development cannot be raised domestically. Privatisation
programmes alleviate this problem by assisting in the development of the domestic
capital market as a source of financing. Furthermore; government has more finances
available for social programmes through sales revenues and the reduction of subsidies.
Local entrepreneurs in the domestic private sector may now engage in the newly
privatised markets, resulting in increased competition, lower prices and better services
for consumers (Sullivan, Rogers & Shkolnikov 2004: 1-5).
The renewed interest by MNCs in privatisation has been sparked by several factors, the
main one being to enter new markets and acquire the SOE's market share. A country
that originally holds little appeal for foreign investors may become very attractive when
a privatisation programme is considered from a long-term opportunity and growth
perspective. The acquisition of existing operations may also be safer and cheaper than a
greenfield investment, depending on issues such as the debt of the SOE and
restructuring costs (Sullivan, Rogers & Shkolnikov 2004: 5-6).
2.3 Bargaining betweenMNCsand nation-states
Negotiation is a basic political or decision-making process. Elgstrëm (1987: 136)
defines a bargaining situation thus "there exists a reciprocal relationship of dependence
between two or more parties, including elements of cooperation and conflict". The
parties by themselves cannot control the outcome of the process and have to negotiate to
find an acceptable solution. All parties have to be of the opinion that it is advantageous
to reach an agreement. Kapoor (1974: 121) expands Elgstrëm's definition by
highlighting the four characteristics of negotiation: "common interests (something to
negotiate for); conflicting interests (something to negotiate about); compromise (give
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and take); and criteria or objectives (determining the objective and the criteria for its
achievement)". A country's approach to negotiation is influenced by its political,
economical, social and cultural systems. Negandhi (1980: 535) explains that the
expectations between nation-states and MNCs are inherently different, because of the
different environments in which they operate. The differences in relative bargaining
power between nation-states and MNCs are derived from their resources and
capabili ties.
Moran (1987: 109) and Tarzi (1991: 243) describe four project characteristics that are
important in evaluating the bargaining positions of nation-states and firms. Firstly, the
greater the absolute investment amount, the more favourable entry the foreign investor
receives. Secondly, the more competing investors there are and the more alternatives
the host country has, the greater the bargaining strength of the nation-state. Conversely,
lack of competition strengthens the MNCs position. Thirdly, the level of technological
complexity influences the bargaining strength between parties. Stable or mature
technology usually reduces the investor's bargaining strength, whereas dynamic, high
technology sectors invariably favour the MNC. Fourthly, the marketing and operational
complexity of the subsidiary affects MNC bargaining strength. Companies whose sales
are determined by strong brand loyalty occupy a strong position in relation to the host.
Table 2.5 below provides a high-level identification of the important variables that
affect power in the bargaining relationship between nation-states and MNCs.
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Table 2.5: Factors influencing the relative bargaining position
Advantage held by Likely regu latio n
Factor
Dependence 'On lo cal reso urces
Dependence 'On local markets
Po litical 'salience'
Government
Government
Government
High
High
High
Industry structure
Many cornpetito rs Government Variable by pro duct
(at entry)
Firm LQW
Firm LQW
Firm LQW
Government Low-high
Firm High
Firm LQW
Firm LQW
Firm Indeterminate
Firm Variable by pro duct
Glo bal tlinka ge '
Business dependent 011:
Proprietary kno W ledge
Highly co mple x pro cess
Labo ur intensity
Capital intensity
Marketing skills
Mo bility 'Of facilities
C '0 st/efficiency
International info rrn atio n
(Source: Stopford & Strange 1991: 27)
2.3.1 Host country bargaining
Tarzi (1991: 237-238) explains that developing countries in their economic relationship
with MNCs have a critical advantage, namely control over access to their territory. This
access includes domestic markets, local labour, and other resources that MNCs require.
Kobrin (1987: 621) adds that the major power resource of the host country is access to
.the domestic market, because its market and economic conditions determine its size, its
level of development, and its potential for future growth. Walters & Blake (1992: 118-
119) support this view and assert that MNCs tend to invest in the most profitable and
growth-oriented industries. As a result, host countries perceive that important sections
of their economy become increasingly subject to the control of MNCs rather than
domestic firms. The host state fears that its influence may be limited to jointly make
critical decisions that affect the affiliate, since the control of MNCs resides in the
. corporate headquarters located in a foreign country.
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The autonomy of the nation-state is also limited since its manufactured output has value
only in conjunction with the rest of the international economic system. Therefore,
interdependence between countries constrains nation-state economic autonomy (Kobrin
1987: 618). Furthermore, developing countries with external account or debt problems
may be restricted in their actions by their reliance on FDI and the often-associated
requirements enforced by international financial organisations or commercial banks, e.g.
IMF, World Bank structural adjustment programmes (Kobrin 1987: 622).
The relative power of the government ministries involved in bargaining and the
relationships am<;mg them, affect the nation-state's ability to carry out its policies.
Bureaucratic conflict within the nation-state not only makes policy implementation
more difficult, but also makes it possible for MNCs· to play ministries off against each
other. In addition, the nation-state's bargaining power will depend on its administrative
ability to monitor and control foreign capital, as well as the knowledge government
officials has of a particular industry (Bennet & Sharpe 1985: 86).
The more national alternatives available to nation-states for meeting the demands of
investment capital, technology or access to export markets, the less need there is for the
MNCs investment and the greater is the nation-state' s power. The nation-state' s range
of alternatives in finding trading partners, lending institutions, or sources of investment
are important for its bargaining position (Bennet & Sharpe 1985: 89).
Wells (1977: 73) explains that nation-states implicitly make two kinds of calculations in
negotiations. Firstly, from an economic perspective, the government tries to determine
what it has to offer or ··relinquish to attract the foreign investor. The second
. consideration, from a political perspective, is what terms of entry MNCs have received
from other developing countries. Domestic political constraints are problematic for
governments. A government may be impeded in its negotiations with foreign investors
by unfavourable criticism lobbied by political opposition parties.
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Tarzi (1991: 246) explains that the greatest international constraint faced by
governments is their reliance on MNCs for global integration, described as "the flow of
raw materials, components, and final products as well as flows of technology, capital
and managerial expertise between the units and subsidiaries of a global corporation".
MNC strategy is influenced by its goal of global integration to develop complex
systems incorporating production and marketing networks to lower costs and expand
their scale. Developing countries who are dependent on such complex MNC factors are
restricted in their bargaining positions.
Balaam & Veseth (1996: 349) argue that the most important demand by the host country
is the degree of' linkages between the MNC subsidiaries and the domestic economy.
Those MNCs setting up operations for local markets are likely to develop linkages with
local firms, although MNCs interested in outsourcing (producing in overseas locations)
usually do not develop linkages with local firms. This has led to the development of
export processing zones (EPZ) explicitly to attract MNC investment (Walters & Blake
1992: 121).
Stopford & Strange (1991: 155-156) agrees with this view and add that local linkages
comprise more than local content requirements only, they also establishe local buyer
and supplier relationships. Without these requirements, MNCs may not be motivated to
engage the local economy and possibly hamper the efficiency of their international
network. On the other hand.. the local economy may not be able to accommodate the
MNCs requirements.
The host nation's performance requirements for MNCs are usually twofold. Demanding
firstly that an increasing share value-added production is done domestically, which
includes more local content and the establishment of local linkages in the local
economy. Secondly, demanding that MNCs use their global networks to export
products and components from the domestic economy (Moran 1988: 9). Stopford &
Strange (1991: 154, 158) state that the demand for increasing local linkages aims to
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reduce the cost of imports and to develop the domestic entrepreneurial capacity.
However, MNCs will always prefer to manage their international assets without
interference from the host nation.
2.3.2 MNC bargaining
Stopford & Strange (1991: 140-143) explain that MNCs take a future orientation
towards strategy and are not as "foot-loose" as often described. There are three main
factors influencing an MNC's choice of location. Firstly, the cost of investment is
determined not only by the financial return of a new local operation, but also by its
impact on the rest of the corporate network. MNCs use the lowest market rates for their
resource procurement and transfer these within their own networks at marginal cost.
This strategy differs totally from that employed by local firms who use national factor
costs and import at prevailing world market rates. Secondly, the factors of economic
risk and political risk determine location. Economic risk involves local conditions and
competitors' actions, both locally and internationally. Increased competition limits the
number of businesses and markets that can be financed and managed adequately.
Thirdly, global competition limits the geographical spread of business. Generally,
preference is given to market size and growth, which is evaluated in terms of political
risk. The assessment of an MNC's strength is based on a combination of product and
territorial importance.
Kobrin (1987: 619-621) explains that the resource-based bargaining power of an MNC
can be deduced from the theory of foreign direct investment. MNCs control firm-
specific advantages (FSAs) such as capital, technology, management skills, access tb
world markets through their networks, a competitive product range, or employment
opportunities, which the developing country needs for economic development. The
complexity of technology, managerial capabilities and access to export markets are all
positively correlated with MNC bargaining power. According to Dunning & Narula
(1997: 11) managerial capabilities include the organisational skills to manage all
activities within the firm, knowledge of supply and distribution markets, the expertise to
sell products successfully, and the capacity to make use of information about other
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technologies, markets and organisations. Kobrin (1987: 619-621) goes further and
emphasises that MNC bargaining power is not simply derived from its technology or
management, but should also be considered relative to the host country's capacities.
The administrative capability and specific industry knowledge of the host country must
be taken into account. Furthermore, host countries may procure technologies they
require internationally, thus strengthening their relative bargaining power.
The nation-state has a greater ability to stipulate a bargaining agreement when the
investment is very important to the MNC's operations and it has few alternatives
available. Such terms could include ownership arrangements or performance
requirements. An MNC will be concerned with the cost and stability of the local labour,
the availability or transportation costs of essential materials. Firms looking to serve the
domestic market will be more concerned with the size and growth potential of the
domestic market and the size of its market share, i.e. monopoly position versus many
competitors (Bennett & Sharpe 1985: 88-89).
2.3.3 Competition
Market conditions (degree of competition) faced by MNCs are significantly related to
the nature of conflict in bargaining. Essentially, a lack of competition among MNCs
decreases the developing country's bargaining position, whereas increased competition
raises the host country's bargaining position. Competition between MNCs is usually
greater where the host country is used as an export platform for serving external
markets, but it tends to be limited for capital-intensive investments designed to serve
only the domestic market. Faced with the option of choice between several willing
investors, the host nation's decision is extremely important in that, amongst other
things, the ability to choose allows the host country to avoid the concentration of
investment by MNCs from one dominant home nation (Tarzi 1991: 241).
Many MNCs are found in highly concentrated industries; dominating key economic
sectors that are critical to nation-states' economic development. Such oligopolistic
practices prevent supply and price competition normally found in competitive industries
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(Tarzi 1991: 237-238). However, MNCs from highly concentrated home markets do
not enjoy the same advantageous position in host nations. The reason for this is the
'follow-the-leader' principle. Oligopolistic firms tend to react defensively to foreign
investments made by competitors. This pattern can be used to their advantage by
developing countries. For example, when one foreign firm from a concentrated industry
invests in a particular country, other competitors from the same industry may be keen to
follow. Therefore, by accepting one investor, the bargaining nation-state may increase
bargaining power as other investors follow (Fagre & Wells 1982: 18-21).
2.3.4 Political salience
The' long-term competitive strategies of firms generally do not take into account the
short-term domestic political considerations. It is, therefore, the host government's
function to balance social and economic forces (Stopford & Strange 1991: 33,54). The
political context within a country affects the bargaining climate, bearing in mind, too,
that the government's capacity to create economic welfare reduces the calls for social
and political change (Stopford & Strange 1991: 56). This balance is, however, not
always possible to accomplish (Kapoor 1974: 125-126). Different interest groups in
society will have different aims regarding foreign investment, and the domestic political
process may influence who gains control over the outcome (Kobrin 1987: 617).
Moran (1987: 15) believes that interference by interest groups is based on anticipated
economic benefits accruing from government intervention. Local business groups may
fear the economic threat that an MNC poses. Alternatively, local elites may be willing
to partner with foreign companies as their own welfare is tied to the MNCs welfare.
Also, local allies are likely to shield the MNC from nationalisation (Moran 1987: 15).
MNC subsidiaries operating in an area of strategic importance to the host nation seem to
attract the greatest governmental intervention. For instance, subsidiaries with a large
number of employees will attract attention to themselves by interest groups such as
labour unions (Poynter 1982: 17-19). Negandhi (1980: 529) adds that the labour
demands of governments sensitive to employment lev~l~_tend to escalate conflict to a
national level in the interest of their negotiations.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
35
2.3.5 Political risk strategies
Another constraint on a host nation's ability to exercise power is the use of political risk
strategies by MNCs. Generally, there are four strategies adopted by MNCs: firstly,
MNCs sequence the investment trances instead of laying out the whole investment at
one time, this gives them a series of bargaining chips to satisfy the government's
demand for revenue over a longer period of time. Secondly, MNCs organise their
activities in such a way that the host government cannot nationalise the entire operation.
Thirdly, MNCs structure their loan agreements in such a way that an abrogation of the
agreement by the host government incurs costs onto that government. Finally,
cooperating with local partners provides protection for the MNC and the project is less
vulnerable to nationalisation (Moran 1987: 12-17).
2.3.6 Technology
The contribution of foreign technology and management knowledge to national
development is difficult to assess. Moran (1987: 17-18) states that there is evidence that
MNCs from industrialised nations bring production methods from their home countries,
especially in an environment of little competition. The affiliates of foreign companies
usually follow the same strategy as their parent firms, which usually concentrate on
technological improvement rather than on reducing costs or adjusting production
methods to suit developing countries' markets. Also, governments may insist on
capital-intensive production in a labour-abundant market in the false belief that older
technology is inferior.
There is also uncertainty about the benefits of technology transfer to developing
countries. Most of the research and development done by MNCs is conducted in the
home countries, and it follows that MNCs do not contribute to the host nation's ability
to produce new technologies for new products and processes. Tarzi (1991: 246) adds
that the royalties charged by MNCs for the use of their technologies further increase the
relative vulnerability of the host nation.
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2.3.7 Capital
It would be expected that parent MNCs would desire more ownership and stronger
control of large investments. However, developing countries insist on ownership and
control in large projects, given the potential impact on the economy. The reality is that
the role of capital investment in MNC bargaining strength is ambiguous as there are an
increasing number of alternative sources of capital available to developing countries
(Fagre & Wells 1982: 15-17). Kobrin (1987: 620) asserts that whether capital serves as
a bargaining resource for MNCs is dependent on the ability of the local financial
market to raise finances.
2.3.8 Marketing
In industries where marketing skills are complex and products differentiated, MNCs
have flexibility to respond to host countries' demands. To counter such demands, firms
may develop new products, include new activities, such as exports, integrate more
technology, or produce more value-added locally. To produce a larger number of
products or exports requires more capital and increased managerial expertise from the
MNC. The host nation, for its part, is eager to gain additional economic benefits from
an existing investment project and prefers a greater variety of goods to be produced
locally, which previously had tobe imported (Tarzi 1991: 243; Kobrin 1987: 613).
2.3.9 Ownership and control
The outcome of bargaining between developing countries and MNCs is evaluated in
terms of all the agreements that affect ownership, control, and the distribution of
economic benefits. MNCs do not have uniform attitudes towards ownership, and these
differences are related to the strategies of the enterprises. However, the distributions of
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ownership, control, and benefits are important to both parties (Fagre & Wells 1982: 9-
10). Biersteker (1980: 212) defines effective control "in terms of managerial
responsibility of financial, technical, and commercial aspects of production, rather than
in terms of responsibility for non-critical functions such as labour relations, product
distribution, and advertising".
The motivations for host governments to 'demand local equity involvement include
gaining better access to information, monitoring the fees paid for technology and
management, regulation of overcharging for production and control over the remittances
of profits and capital. A high concentration of foreign ownership may have
considerable political impact apart from economic costs (Lecraw 1984: 27).
The link between level of equity and control is not straightforward. Depending on the
type of technology transferred, the capabilities of local partners, and government
regulations, an MNC may control operations it considers vital, without majority
ownership through technical service or licensing agreements. This way, MNCs reduce
government intervention in the operation of their affiliates, while at the same time
earning profits generated by their firm-specific advantages. All else being equal, the
requirement by the MNC for higher levels of equity ownership should increase as the
economic ties between the parent and subsidiary decrease (Lecraw 1984: 27-32).
Firms usually demand control or majority ownership of those products in principal
markets that are considered central to the firm's success. In these principal markets,
conventional forms of FDI bargaining continue, where nation-states demand that firms
adapt production to the local environment, a demand usually opposed by firms when
they are increasing their linkages into other countries. At the other end of the spectrum,
MNCs exit marginal product lines from marginal territories, but exit barriers may
hamper this. These exit barriers exist when more is lost than gained through exiting.
Exit barriers for firms may include the capital investment that cannot be recovered,
expenses and liabilities that are incurred in the exiting process, and firms may not want
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to relinquish their market share to competitors. Nation-states have little power over
such decisions but it can be made to work to their advantage. Alternatively, MNCs can
use the threat of exiting to obtain a better bargain from the host government (Stopford &
Strange 1991: 144-147).
Conclusion
Important changes in the global production structure have altered the relationship
between MNCs and nation-states. The transition in the 1970s from the Fordist to Post-
Fordist mode of production was driven by the rapid development of new technologies,
which emphasised product innovation through flexible manufacturing processes over
the price competitiveness of mass production. This emerging global competition forced
MNCs to establish integrated international production systems located across the globe,
to take advantage of the differences in cost, resources, logistics and markets. Nation-
states facilitated this mobility of MNCs by liberalising trade and investment policies to
attract FDI and its associated technology and knowledge transfers. Historically, FDI is
concentrated in the industrialised nations and Africa remains marginalised, because of .
its small and underdeveloped markets. However, Africa has been able to increase its
FDI receipts from MNCs in recent years through significant privatisation programmes.
Various factors influence the bargaining strength of MNCs and host states, respectively.
The host state controls access to its territory and its level of development influences its
bargaining strength vis-a-vis MNCs. Governments aim to regulate investment in the
public interest and demand that MNCs fulfil certain development objectives, such as the
transfer of technology and capital, establishment of linkages with local firms and
promotion of exports. MNCs aim to determine the .optimal locations for various
segments of their production value chains in order to contest global markets effectively.
MNCs have several firm-specific advantages that increase their bargaining strength
compared to host states,' such as control over technology, capital, access to global
markets and marketing capabilities. Chapter 3 will illustrate the MNC-host. state
bargaining relationship in Sub-Saharan African telecommunications privatisation.
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Chapter 3
State-Firm Bargaining over Privatisation in Sub-Saharan Africa
Introduction
This chapter explains the bargaining dynamic between MNCs and developing countries
in the privatisation process. Many privatisation programmes in developing countries are
aimed at attracting the participation of foreign MNCs with advanced technologies and
managerial expertise. Specifically, in the telecommunications industry there is a great
reliance on MNCs to improve infrastructure. The historic development of state-owned
enterprises and the transition towards privatisation by nation-states in the public
provision of utilities is discussed first. Secondly, the trends and the methods used to
. effect privatisation in developing countries, specifically Sub-Saharan Africa, are
examined, followed by a description of host state and MNC bargaining objectives in
privatisation. In the fourth section, the impact MNC-host state bargaining has on the
outcome of telecommunications privatisation programmes is illustrated.
3.1 Historical background
Poor infrastructure (i.e. telecommunications, electricity, water supply, and transport) is
a major obstacle to Sub-Saharan Africa's (SSA) economic development and the region
can benefit greatly from privatisation. Inadequate infrastructure impacts negatively on
the standards of living of a country and its capability to compete internationally in
commerce. Service provision under state-owned monopolies is often burdened with
multiple, poorly defined objectives. Furthermore, it has to contend with weak
incentives for efficient tariff policies, often favouring the more prosperous sectors at the
expense of rural communities. The recruitment decisions of public enterprises often
reflect a political desire to create jobs without regard for efficiency (Kerf & Smith 1996:
ix). After gaining independence, African governments were often seen to depend on
large public sectors to foster economic growth, because of the poor state of domestic
private business (Harsch 2000: 8).
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In order to explain why African nations chose development strategies that emphasised
heavy government intervention in the economy, one may examine the events occurring
in the post-independence era around the 1960s; e.g. public policy formulated to reverse
the negative impact of colonialism on economic development and attempts to facilitate
economic growth rates comparable to the industrialised nations. At that time, market
forces structures were viewed as being monopolised by the industrialised nations and
their MNCs, resulting in uneven terms of trade for Africa and therefore not suitable for
economic development in an African context. An alternative strategy of "economic
self-reliance" was pursued that called for greater government involvement in the
economy until such time that the country was able to compete internationally, its
economic status having improved. Examples of this policy include import-substitution
strategies, pegged interest rates and foreign exchange regimes and a larger role for state-
owned enterprises (Internet 6).
Since many African countries lacked private enterprises to facilitate the process of
modernisation, international donor finance was often used to finance large public
investment projects. The combined effect of Africa's policies of state intervention and a
decline in commodity prices in the 1980s saw Africa's economic growth slow down
with increasing levels of debt. The weakness of these policies is illustrated by the fact
that during the 1980s several African countries were spending in excess of 20% of their
export receipts to payoff external debt (Internet 6).
In consultation with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), African
countries coupled debt rescheduling with Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs).
In 1990, there were 2 754 SOEs in Africa, 76% of them found in SSA. Looking at the
SOEs in SSA it was found in the worst instances that they contributed 35% percent of
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), consumed 40% of national investment and were
responsible for 35% of formal sector employment, 60% of unpaid domestic credit, 8%
of external debt owed by government, and 5% of government spending (Internet 6). By
1998, the World Bankwas providing financing to thirty-four African countries to assist
in their privatising efforts (Harsch 2000: 10) ..
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Wallsten (1999: 2-3) states "most developing countries nationalised telecommunications
services in the 1960s". Reform of telecommunications industries actually began in the
1980's due to a number of reasons, such as; the very poor performance of state-owned
telecommunications monopolies, technological advances reducing the support for
telecommunications to be treated as a natural monopoly, to satisfy unmet consumer
demand, and a requirement by the multilateral finance institutions as part of structural
adjustment programmes. Telecommunications reform usually involves three
components: "privatising the state-owned monopoly provider, introducing competition,
and creating an independent regulatory administration". Gebreab (2002: 7) considers
that "telecommunications in Africa can be characterised by low penetration, poor
quality and unreliability". He identifies "the following as the main reasons for
underdevelopment in Africa: (i) lack of investment, (ii) investment inefficiencies, (iii)
inadequate private sector involvement, (iv) foreign exchange scarcity, (v) poor
management incentives, and (vi) insufficient regional development".
The aim of many developing countries in liberalising their telecommunications regimes
is to access better technologies produced by MNCs in industrialised nations.
Technology information cannot be exchanged easily, because the buyer is not in
possession of the product and thus is not able to price it properly. MNCs base their
survival on "internalising" these differences in the market, along with other cross-border
transaction costs. The firm is able keep control and earn revenue from its technology
through FDI, while the country gets the advantage of using that technology. FDI may
also be motivated to increase the MNC's market power through its size together with its
technological capabilities. Larger market shares significantly increase profits,
especially in the fast growing telecommunications sectors that are traditionally
oligopolistic in nature. Telecommunications has become a particularly dynamic sector
for privatisation (Taka 2001: 2-3). In the African context, the outdated technology of
telephone networks, and use by only a small section of the population are significant
drawbacks. African governments have realised that new technologies and investment
can be sourced from MNCs, thus assisting in the development of their networks by
selling off stakes in the incumbent networks (Harsch 20QQ_:9).
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3.2 Privatisation trends in developing countries
It has been estimated that in the early 1990s, the sum of annual losses suffered through
wastage and poor pricing were equal to the annual investment made in infrastructure in
developing countries. In the same decade, many counties began to bring in the private
sector to participate in infrastructure through financing and management. From 1990 to
2001, developing countries attracted approximately USD77S billion in 2 500
infrastructure projects through private participation. By 2001, 132 developing countries
moved to private participation in infrastructure. The largest concentration was in the
Latin American and the Caribbean region, the bulk being in the telecommunications and
power sectors (Harris 2003: 1-6).
In SSA, more than 3 000 privatisation programmes had been undertaken by 1998,
mostly in Angola, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia.
However, the financial gain was relatively small, because of the small size of the
enterprises that were divested, and represented only 3% of the earnings that accrued to
developing countries for the period 1990 to 1999 (Kikeri & Nellis 2002: 4).
Sub-Saharan Africa's share of global annual investment in telecommunications by
private investors grew significantly in the last decade, from an almost zero base in 1990
to 10% in 2001. Most of this expansion occurred in the cellular sector, while thirteen
countries privatised their national operators, thirty-nine countries introduced private
participation over the same the period. Telecommunications was also responsible for
the greatest amount of investment and number of projects during this time. The
introduction of cellular telecommunications in Africa disrupted the monopoly enjoyed
by African incumbent operators. Essentially, there are two methods of establishing
private participation in telecommunications. Firstly, the thirteen counties mentioned
above, which included Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Senegal and South Africa, transferred
parts of the national network to the private sector and introduced cellular phone services
through greenfield investments. The other thirty-nine countries also introduced
competition in the cellular industry through greenfield projects, but left their national
fixed-line operators untouched. Entry costs were reduced by technological advances,
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which resulted in the transformation of the market structure and nature of competition
(World Bank 2003: 82-83, 116). Generally, the privatisation of state-owned
telecommunications operations in Africa and South America occurred through the sale
of a large equity share to a US or European MNC (Taka 2001: 4-5).
Table 3.1 illustrates total private participation in infrastructure projects in developing
countries; private investment in infrastructure broken down per state-owned utility
sectors; and private participation in telecommunications privatisation in developing
regions for the period 1990 to 2001. Globally, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has been
marginalised from private investment in infrastructure, recording only 3% of cumulative
investment. The telecommunications industry has attracted the most investment of all
previously state-owned utilities in all developing regions. Private participation in SSA
telecommunications privatisation has taken place in thirty-nine countries involving 100
projects.
Table 3.1: Private participation in infrastructure projects, 1990-2001
Total private investment in infrastructure
Private investment in
telecommunications
Private investment in
infrastructure per sector
(Source: Adapted from Harris 2003: 6-7; World Bank 2003: 122)
3.3 Methods of privatisation
3.3.1 Concessions / Build, Own and Transfer (BOT)
Kerf & Smith (1996: 14) describe a concession as the process by which "the private
operator manages the infrastructure facility, operates it at its own commercial risk and
accepts investment obligations from the government, whether to build a new facility,
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expand or rehabilitate an existing facility". This model is common where the
government wants to attract investment from the private sector, but does not to want to
give up its ownership. These contracts have a fixed term and involve the transfer of
assets back to the state at the end of the term when it may be opened to a competitive
bidding process again.
3.3.2 Demonopolisation and new entry / Build, Own and Operate (BOO)
The government may choose to relinquish monopoly restrictions of an industry and
grant private business access to the market. The new participant may be complementary
or in competition to the existing public enterprise. The incumbent enterprise remains
under governmental control and thus may reduce the benefits of introducing
competition. The intention is that the presence of competition would indirectly improve
the performance of the public enterprise (Kerf & Smith 1996: 15-16).
3.3.3 Divestiture
Kerf & Smith (1996: 14) describe divestiture as "the sale of the government's shares in
a state-owned enterprise" - and illustrates the government's dedication to private sector
involvement in infrastructure delivery. This approach is becoming more widespread in
telecommunications, energy and airline industries around the world (Kerf & Smith
1996: 17). White & Bhatia (1998: 10) expand on this definition by including the "sales
of minority government-held shares, transfers of shares or assets, public enterprise
mergers, official liquidations and asset sales through means other than liquidation".
Table 3.2 identifies the methods employed in privatisation and the potential benefits that
are usually associated with each method.
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Table 3.2: The main forms and potential benefits of infrastructure privatisation
Potential Benefits
Concession! Build, Demonopolise/
Management Own, Transfer Build, Own,
contracts Lease (BOT) Operate (BOO) Divestiture
./ ./ ./ ./ ./
./ ./ ./ ./
./ ./ ./
./ ./ ../ ./..... "V"
greenfield investments ./
Management expertise
Tariff discipline
Access to private capital
Capital market development
Potential capital revenues
(Source: Adapted from Kerf &Smith 1996: 10)
Table 3.3 demonstrates that Sub-Saharan Africa tends to use greenfield projects (BOT
or BOO) to increase capacity for all infrastructure utilities. This type of project, mainly
used in mobile telecommunications, led private investment in monetary value and
. number of projects (World Bank 2003: 81). Annexure A, identifies the
telecommunications privatisation projects in SSA that involve foreign MNCs .. The
annexure was compiled from the World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure
(PPI) database. From the schedule it can also be seen that greenfield investments and
divestiture are the most popular forms of privatisation in telecommunications.
Table 3.3: Infrastructure projects with private participation by sector and type in
Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990-2001
Sector
Management
and le ase
contracts
Concessions Demonopolise
(BOT) (BOO) Divestiture Total
(Source: Adapted from World Bank 2003: 89)
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3.4 Project assessment
The viability of a project is assessed by the return on investment ratio, which takes the
total expected cash flow into consideration. This includes dividends, royalties,
management fees, trademark fees and also the impact on profitability the investment
will have on the whole organisation, which likely is located elsewhere. Investment is
probable when the project produces returns to commensurate the cost of capital and the
risk exposure taken. The more risk involved in a project, the higher the rates of return
that would be required. Calculating return on capital is often difficult. For example, it
is difficult to assess financially all the earnings and expenditures of a project. Further,
to value the cost of appropriate risk premium for the cost of capital such as the
possibility of political risk or economic risk, determined by the devaluation of the
currency, exchange controls, or new state regulation in the future, may prove a complex
. task (Stopford & Strange 1991: 150-151).
Governments determine the viability of a project in terms of what it contributes to the
country, referred to as the "economic or social rate of return". The firm's assessment of
prices and expenses may be incorrect, because of the government's intervention in the
market or deficiencies in the market. For example, price levels are influenced by the
tariff regime faced by the firm, and costs could be miscalculated due to subsidies. The
government will try to determine a "hurdle rate" to benchmark that the project
represents the best alternative use of national resources. These calculations will
determine if project returns are acceptable to both parties. If so, they will then bargain
to share the benefits between them. The firm's assessment is in terms of the
organisation as a whole, which may be global in nature, whereas the government
assesses only the local impact. Increasing pressure on governments to industrialise may
see them sanctioning projects that come at a high cost, especially in the early stages of
industrialisation or in cases of high indebtedness (Stopford & Strange 1991: 151-154).
The telecommunications sector contributes to the social and economic development of a
country, and such the governments, will usually aim to expand access to the
telecommunications infrastructure, given its poor service levels. On the other hand,
private enterprises will focus on the areas that are most lucrative and therefore cannot be
depended upon to support the developmental goal of universal access to the entire
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population. Therefore, there remains an important regulatory role for the state in
telecommunications (Makhaya & Roberts 2002: 6-7). Table 3.4 graphically illustrates
the preceding discussion about the bargaining range for firms and nation-states, which is
determined by their required rates of return from the project.
Table 3.4: Estimating the project returns precedes the bargaining
I Private hurdle rate
Bargaining about the
dis tribu tio n 0f gains
I Social hurdle rate
20 25
Governments may hot sanction the
project unless they can fInd
political benefits
5 10 15 30
Real fmancial rate of return (%)
(Source: Stopford & Strange 1991: 153)
3.5 Host country objectives in privatisation
Haggarty, Shirly & Wallsten (2003: 13) list three conditions to be met for reform to be
possible: (i) "it is politically desirable, in that the political benefits from reform are
greater than the political costs; (ii) it is politically feasible, meaning reform can be
implemented by overcoming opposition, and; (iii) it is credible to investors, workers and
other actors". The major motivations for privatisation have been; the need to develop
the private sector by reducing state involvement in the economy (a requirement for
World Bank and IMF financial support), the necessity to earn revenues, sustaining
employment, maintaining competitiveness and expanding ownership (White & Bhatia
1998: 27-31).
The benefits of privatisation follow from a fundamental change in the institutional
relationship between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and government. The SOE moves
away from the direct control and political influence of the government. The
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managements of SOEs have limited power to negotiate lasting tariff and policy
undertakings from government, whereas private investors may hold back or remove
investment until the government agrees to its obligations. Similarly, the government
can gain more control by removing or substituting the private participants with
competitors (Kerf & Smith 1996: 6-7).
The privatisation of infrastructure offers various benefits: firstly, there is increased
efficiency of investment, management and operation. Private firms will require reliable
assurances from the government to the imposition of tariff levels that will recoup costs,
so ensuring that their investments will earn the required financial returns. In order to
maximise profitability, private firms will also have a strong incentive to contain costs
and Increase productivity. This is achieved by containing the costs of new projects,
reducing the number of staff, the introduction of new technologies and processes, and
improving invoicing and collection procedures. Countries can acquire new technologies
and management expertise by permitting private participation in infrastructure. This is
particularly important in SSA countries, which do not have the requisite skilled
resources. Secondly, governments can gain access to private finance. Private firms
raise their own funds and invest capital in the venture when they are confident of good
management and predictable profits (Kerf & Smith 1996:7-8).
Thirdly, infrastructure privatisation allows governments to focus on their major
responsibilities such as economic and social development, without the necessity of
having to manage SOEs. This is especially helpful when governments do not have
capability or necessary human resources in place. Fourthly, as a result of the investment
that privatisation introduces, public spending and debt can be reduced. For instance, the
proceeds earned from divestiture may be used to service public debt. Also, when an
infrastructure venture operates economically, it provides continual taxation income, in
contrast to the large public expenditure usually incurred in SOEs. Fifthly, the large and
predictable cash flows from properly managed infrastructure projects allow for the
development of capital markets where debt and equity instruments are traded
domestically. Capital market instruments are sought after by institutional investors and
may also encourage flight capital to return to the country. Sixthly, experience from
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reforming economies in Latin America and Eastern Europe shows that infrastructure
privatisation is a catalyst for large inflows of FDI. Lastly, the short-tern political
pressures faced by governments in privatisation are lessened, such as labour
redundancies and the relinquishing of control of important sectors of the economy,
when a government illustrates that it is dedicated to proper financial administration,
well-functioning policies and promoting private sector activity (Kerf & Smith 1996:7-
10).
During the 1960s and 1970s most African countries restricted FDI in certain sectors and
limited participation to a minority share of equity. In recent years the investment
regimes have been liberalised. Despite these liberalisations, uncertainties surrounding
the legal environment, the banking system, and the quality of the infrastructure persist
for potential foreign investors (White & Bhatia 1998: 67). For the successful
implementation of privatisation, it is important to define clear regulatory rules for the
bidding process, which sectors are open for participation, which governmental entities
may award contracts, and the contractual and pricing terms (Kerf & Smith 1996: 35-38).
Traditionally, price regulation is intended to protect the consumer from being exploited
by a monopoly. However, governments may interfere with infrastructure price
regulation for short-term political gain (Kerf & Smith 1996: 38). The advantage of a
regulatory framework is that it sets out clear rules that providing clarity for investor and
officials and reduces the possibility of corruption. This regulatory capacity requires
improved administration and monitoring capabilities from governments, which may
lack professional knowledge in areas such as law, technology, health and safety, or
environmental standards. The creation of independent regulatory agencies assists in the
development of necessary technical capability, which usually enjoys legal protection in
preventing direct political influence and is subject to its own system of accountability.
In Africa the development of independent regulators started only in recent years, mainly
in the telecommunications sector (Kerf & Smith 1996: 35,40-42). Experience has
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shown that when a legal framework. is in place to support privatisation, prior to
commencement of the process, it assists greatly in the successful implementation of the
programme, reduces public opposition and creates the required institutional capacity
(White & Bhatia 1998: 65-66).
On the issue of competition many activities in SSA have 'long been restricted to state-
owned monopolies with a single enterprise undertaking all stages of production. These
arrangements were thought to be justified because of the "natural monopoly"
characteristics of these industries. A natural monopoly is found in a sector with high
fixed costs and economies of scale, meaning that only the largest and most cost-
effective firm will survive. In the case of telecommunications, the high fixed costs of
network investments are an effective barrier of entry for the incumbent operator
(Achterberg 2000: 6,14). It is usulaly more difficult to increase competition in
infrastructure, because it tends to be a natural monopoly. However, the introduction of
competition is possible in areas such as cellular and long-distance telephony. If
additional competitors cannot be introduced into a market, increased competition can
still be created for the market by making contracts of a predefined time frame available
through a competitive tender process (Kerf & Smith 1996: 7). The small size of many
African markets is another reason why the introduction of successful competition is not
possible. Also, international investors may insist on monopoly rights to compensate for
the risks of entering new markets (Kerf & Smith 1996: 37).
On the issue of ownership and control many SSA countries claim that privatisation aims
to broaden ownership as this satisfies the national aspirations of advancing economic
participation and also increases political acceptance of privatisation. Given the
importance of SOEs in Africa in the post-independence era, it is understandably
regarded as public property. It is a representation of sovereignty and there remains
strong support for government ownership, thus it would be more acceptable to sell it to
a domestic group rather than to foreigners. However, the public's assessment of an
SOE may overvalue its true performance and worth. Governments may be either
unaware or unwilling to let the public know how poorly these enterprises have been
functioning. Although a political aim may be to widen ownership domestically, foreign
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strategic partners introduce new investments, established managerial skills, new
technology, and market access (White & Bhatia 1998: 31-32). Public resistance to
privatisation may be reduced when shares are issued for sale to the public. In this way,
greater public involvement is created, with an interest in making sure that the
government maintains its commitments to profitable tariff levels and appropriate
policies (Kerf & Smith 1996: 8-9).
3.6 MNC objectives in privatisation in Sub-Saharan Africa
The four main challenges to privatisation in SSA are, firstly, concerns over market size,
affordability and payment risks; secondly, the establishment of adequate legal and
regulatory frameworks; thirdly, mobilising private investment finance; and fourthly,
dealing with non-commercial risk, i.e. political risk strategies (Kerf & Smith 1996: ix-
xii).
From a commercial perspective, the size of the market is determined not by the size of
the population, but by the number of potential customers. Evaluating market size from
a commercial perspective of recovering costs based on demand and credit worthiness of
the consumers is often difficult in SSA countries, especially when services were
subsidised in the past and poor management of accounts by public enterprises was
prevalent. Further, poor economic development and low-income distribution of the
population raises doubts as to the viability of the consumer base. A positive attribute in
the assessment process is that the poor distribution of basic utilities such as
telecommunications and electricity may suggest opportunities for future expansion
(Kerf & Smith 1996: 21-22).
The assessment of market size for telecommunications in Africa has been positive for
investors in recent times. Telecommunications have traditionally been less subsided
than other utilities and the cellular telephone market has found that a large part of the
population is prepared and capable to pay for dependable telephone services. Where
domestic markets are too small, cross-border projects may increase the potential market
size (Kerf & Smith 1996: 21-22). One such regional development has been the
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establishment of the Telecommunications Regulators Association of Southern Africa
(TRASA), which is responsible for complementing telecommunications regulations
between Southern African Development Community (SADC) member states (Li, Qiang
& Xu 1998: 8).
On the issue of affordability, private investment requires that tariffs recoup the full cost
of service delivery. If the tariffs do not cover the full costs then the shortfall has to be
funded through taxation. Experience has shown that SSA governments cannot afford
new investment and maintenance due to a lack of financing. It is also probable that
price levels are higher under a poorly managed public enterprise with inflated cost
structures than would be the case with a well-organised provider with tariffs that cover
full costs. Private operators can save costs by reducing over-staffing and improving
collection practices rather than increasing tariffs. If the calculated full price is
politically unacceptable to the government it can subsidise the private operator for the
difference between the tariff and full cost (Kerf & Smith 1996: 24-26).
Another issue of affordability is the argument that private capital costs more than public .
capital and that this will lead to higher prices for consumers. It is true that private
entities borrow at higher rates than the sovereign borrowing rate, but the difference
between the private and public borrowing rates is that the tax-paying public carries the
liability of public sector projects. In private projects with cost-covering prices these
risks are borne by consumers instead of the general public. If a government could
borrow at a lower rate than the private sector, it would be advantageous for it to provide
credit to the whole economy, and not only to infrastructure (Harris 2003: 25). On the
issue of payment risk, in many SSA countries the perception continues that the state
provides free utility service and there is a culture of non-payment. The introduction of a
private operator who is enabled to discontinue service delivery to non-payers has proved
effective in the collection of payments. Under public ownership it is often politically
unacceptable to disconnect the poorer segments of the population. However, the private
operator may still have in difficulty collecting from government customers because their
functions cannot be interrupted (Kerf & Smith 1996: 26-31).
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The main motivation for MNCs in the telecommunications industry is obviously to
increase their income from their technological resources and the opportunities for
expansion into new markets in Africa. The low levels of service provision suggest good
potential for market development. The profitability of potential markets is determined
not only by servicing more previously excluded areas, but also increasing the variety of
services available to household and corporate customers. MNCs are well suited to do
this through their scope of products and services while operating the network. This
enables smaller domestic firms to develop their own capacities to provide
complementary products and services, if arrangements are in place to grant access to
that network. The advantages of introducing new technologies will be increased if both
local and international companies may engage in value-added network services without
restriction, promoting competition and choice (Taka 200 1: 10).
3.7 Political risk strategies
Infrastructure investments are usually substantial, capital intensive and fixed in their
location. Besides the risks normally linked to SSA, such as war, civil unrest or
expropriation, there are also other non-commercial risks too. Tariff regulation is often
at the centre of regulatory frameworks. In this context, SSA with its tradition of
subsidising prices, gives rise to concern amongst foreign investors that the government
may retract pricing agreements in favour of political goals. But this risk is not equal
across all industries and investors are likely to seek out certain industries in preference
to others. For instance, the tariffs for telecommunications, ports, freight transport and
bulk supply of water are usually less politically sensitive than for retail electricity, water
and passenger transport. The investor may also reduce the risk of an immobile
investment by adopting more transportable technologies, such as cellular technology
instead of fixed line (Kerf & Smith 1996: 47-52).
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Large infrastructure investments often have financial commitments to service in foreign
currencies, to suppliers, lenders and shareholders. The income from domestic projects
is often in local currency and the investor will insist on being able to convert and to
transfer the foreign exchange. This is resolved in many countries with restrictive
foreign exchange regimes by granting foreign investors the exemption to take funds out
of the country (Kerf & Smith 1996: 50-51).
Going into partnership with the domestic private sector may offer support to the foreign
investor. For instance, a local partner will know the business environment better and
can also assist in securing local finance, decreasing the project's foreign exchange risk.
It may also be less likely that a government will interfere negatively with the
management of the project or break its regulatory obligations if there is participation by
local parties. In this respect, public share offerings and investments by insurance or
pension funds may be a way to facilitate greater participation from the population to
ensure the project is kept profitable (Kerf & Smith 1996: 52-53).
Another strategy to reduce political interference is to introduce new technologies and
increase the share of local employees. Finally, entering into partnership with the
government is common in public-private joint ventures, an advantageous strategy for
the MNC as the government's involvement may facilitate the project considerably. The
government in this case has a financial interest in the success of the project and is less
likely to break its commitments. Government participation may also reduce public
opposition to foreign participation (Kerf & Smith 1996: 53-54).
3.8 The impact of privatisation in telecommunications
Concerning the general impact of privatisation across all infrastructure sectors, evidence
suggests that in many cases private provision is better than the public provision of
services. The private sector's technical and managerial expertise, combined with more
sustainable pricing policies and better financial discipline, provide more resources for
investing in expansion than under public provision. The greatest gains come through
increased investments to meet increasing demand in serving previously unattended
consumers. Private participation has been able to improve efficiency through the
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introduction of incentives to reduce wasteful costs and.to collect revenues. Some of the
largest gains have been in the telecommunication industry where the main driver for
improved efficiency has been competition. Improving the self-sustainability of utilities
can reduce previously large governmental subsidies (Harris 2003: 17-22).
Private provision also gives governments the opportunity to raise revenues through
proceeds from divestiture, and license and concession fees. Additionally, established
private participation schemes have a higher coverage of poor households than publicly
owned utilities (Harris 2003: 24-26). These results are supported by comprehensive
research conducted by Kikeri & Nellis (2002), which illustrates the importance of
private ownership for effective competition. There is strong evidence that private
ownership produces more restructuring than state ownership in almost all developing
countries. It illustrates that privatisation improves the firms' financial and operating
performance in the majority of cases. Boubakri & Cosset (1999) concluded that from a
sample of 107 companies from 25 developing countries in 26 industries, newly
privatised firms exhibit significant increases in profitability, operating efficiency,
capital spending, real sales, total employment and dividends. Furthermore, privatisation
does not necessarily lead to a decline in employment levels. It can be inferred that
higher levels of investment and efficiency lead to greater output and employment.
Research on cellular technologies in 41 African countries from 1987 to 2000,
.undertaken by Gebreab (2002), shows that telecommunications markets with two or
more competitors grew almost twice as fast as monopoly markets. Fink, Mattoo &
Rathindran (2002) researched the effects of privatisation in the telecommunication
sectors of 86 developing countries from 1985 to 1999. They found that the number of
mainlines per population (i.e. teledensity) and labour productivity increased
significantly in telecommunications markets with privati sed incumbents, extra
competitors and separate regulators, compared to countries with little or no reform.
Also, the succession in which new competitors are introduced to markets had an effect
on sector performance. Introducing competition after the national operator had been
privati sed led to lower teledensity than when privatisation was undertaken while
introducing new competitors at the same time. These results indicate that the
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
56
exclusivity period sometimes given to privatised organisations might be harmful to the
process of reform, even when competitors are introduced at a later stage.
Wallsten (1999) conducted empirical research on telecommunications privatisation in
30 countries in Africa and Latin America from 1984 to 1997. The results indicated that
on its own, privatisation leads to job losses, but the introduction of competition
increased employment levels, which illustrates that additional investment creates more
jobs. Privatisation and the subsequent introduction of competition by itself were found
to reduce main line penetration and connection capacity. Therefore, without a regulator
there is no incentive to prevent monopolistic and uncompetitive practices. However,
Wallsten also found that the presence of a strong regulator and competition resulted in
increased mainline penetration, more payphones, increased connection capacity,
increased labour efficiency and lower prices for calls. Therefore, it is important that
there is a regulator to stimulate competition, with the capacity to enforce rules for fair
competition. Regulators' functions would govern the structure of the markets, the
requirements for market entry and the stipulations of access to the monopoly network
facilities (Makhaya & Roberts 2002: 4-5). Furthermore, Wallsten. (2002) tested a
telecommunications sample of 200 countries from 1985 to 1999 to determine whether
the creation of an institutional framework before privatisation would promote
competition. He found that countries that established separate regulatory authorities
prior to privatisation saw increased telecommunications investment, fixed telephone
penetration and cellular concentration, compared to countries that did not. Moreover, it
was established that investors were willing to pay more for telecommunications firms in
countries with an established regulatory authority, because investment risks are greater
where regulatory rules are unclear.
In a study of telecommunications in 167 countries, Li, Qiang & Xu (1998) found that in
virtually all countries there is a ministry and/or regulator responsible for a number of
functions such as; the telephone numbering plan, tariff approvals, technical standards,
interconnection rates, mechanisms for settling disputes, frequency allocation,
monitoring service quality, and the setting up of license fees and licensing. Li & Xu
(2002) used a data set of 166 countries to compare the impact of privatisation and
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competition in the telecommunications sector. They found that privatisation was
associated with a substantial reduction in employment, nearly 50%. This is consistent
with the expectation that privatisation leads to job losses in over-staffed SOEs. There
was a significant increase in labour productivity of over 40% associated with
privatisation. While both privatisation and competition increased productivity, it was
concluded that competition was a stronger force than privatisation in enhancing
productivity. Investment rose sharply and there was a rapid expansion of the telephone
network following privatisation.
Conclusion
MNC participation in privatisation illustrates the increasing power that MNCs have in
bargaining with host states. The poor economic performance of African states and
rising levels of debt forced governments to reduce their intervention in the economy and
accept private control over public service provision, through privatisation. African
governments can obtain new investment relatively easily, as well as technological
resources, by reforming their monopolisation of telecommunications.
Telecommunications has been the most successful form of privatisation in SSA. The
most popular forms of telecommunications privatisation are to demonopolise the
industry and admit private entrants, or to sell shares in the state-owned incumbent to
established MNCs. The driving force for MNCs in telecommunications in SSA is the
maximisation of returns from their technological capabilities and the undeveloped
market potential in the region. The privatisation of telecommunications and the
subsequent introduction of competition have positive results for increased investment,
profitability, operating efficiency, services coverage and employment levels.
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Chapter4
Conclusion
Foreign direct investment by MNCs is driving the globalisation process that
characterises the contemporary global economy. MNCs are the dominant element of
the multinational system of production through their capacity to acquire and control
technology, knowledge and capital. Thus they play an important role for all nation-
states who require these capacities for their economic development. The objective of
this assignment has been to provide evidence that there is an increased shift in the
'balance of power' to MNCs, in the global political economy, between MNCs and
nation-states. The Stopford & Strange (1991) approach to MNC-State bargaining was
used as a basis for the inquiry. The exploration of this bargaining relationship focused
.on developing countries and the study culminated in an illustration of MNC
involvement in infrastructure privatisation in Sub-Saharan Africa in general and in
telecommunications specifically.
The Stopford & Strange (1991) framework argues that there have been fundamental
changes in the nature of competition between nation-states. In the past, nation-states
competed over territory and wealth-creating resources, but in a globalised economy they
have to compete for market share. The pursuit of wealth-creating activities is important
to the nation-state for its welfare and internal cohesion. The magnitude of FDI under
the control of MNCs and its impact on the nation-state' s economic development makes
it important for nation-states to attract MNCs to set up operations in their territory. This
benefits the nation-state wi~h technology and knowledge transfers and additional capital
that may not be available domestically. This drive resulted in the liberalisation of
national industrial policies in order to attract FDI. MNCs are attracted by the potential
growth prospects of countries, based on the size of internal markets, skilled labour,
favourable regulatory regimes and natural resources. Moreover, MNCs also face
increased competition for survival due to changes in the structure of global markets and
the rapid development of new technologies. Thus, there is a growing interaction
between the development strategies of nation-states and the global commercial
strategies of MNCs. MNCs and nation-states are jointly exercising control over
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national and international economic development, as well as being competitors for
market shares as a means to wealth and survival. Collectively, nation-states are
retreating from their former participation in ownership and control over industry,
services and trade, and leaving it to MNCs who have better access capital, technology
and managerial expertise.
This assignment posed the question of how contemporary global production changed to
increase the mobility and bargaining power of MNCs. The international production
structure that was established after the Second World War and lasted until the 1970s,
was characterised by the expansion of mass production, commonly known as Fordism.
In this paradigm; nation-states focused on import-substitution developmental strategies
and encouraged firms to standardise production processes and output through
specialisation. Competitiveness was determined by the lowest possible price for output,
which was achieved by reducing costs through increasing the economies of scale of
manufacturing plants using low cost, labour intensive processes. By the 1960s this form
of production began to fail as productivity growth slowed down in the industrialised
nations and new competition emerged from developing nations, such as the NICs. .
Commercial competitiveness was henceforth based on product innovation instead of
price competition.
The driving force of rapid technological change truncated product life cycles, which led
to the increasingly rapid development and manufacture of new and modified products.
Maximising product innovation required multi-skilled labour, flexible automation and
greater cooperation between firms. This economic development is known as Post-
Fordism. Also, the falling costs of transport and communications made it economical to
relocate and integrate operations across the globe in search for efficiency to reduce
transaction costs. Information and computer technologies reduced the cost of acquiring
and disseminating information and coordinating production for world markets. These
developments saw the emergence of integrated international production systems that
effected the geographic location decisions of MNCs to maximise the competitiveness of
the corporate system as a whole. As the mobility of MNCs developed, it increased their
ability to move away from the factor costs of a national location and to build networks
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of supply from various locations to service international opportunities efficiently. The
nation-state's immobility of resources challenged old economic notions of comparative
advantage in international trade and countries had to negotiate with MNCs to have
value-added activities located within their borders.
The next research question aimed at discovering how MNCs increased their influence
and power vis-á-vis nation-states in their bargaining relationships. Developing
countries have a critical advantage over MNCs, namely control over access to their
territory. This access includes internal markets, supply of local labour, investment
supplies, raw materials and any other resources MNCs may seek. The nation-state' s
bargaining position is usually increased if it has other alternatives for meeting demands
of investment capital and technology or access to export markets. One of the most
important demands made by host states is the degree of linkage between the MNC and
the local economy. The aim of the host state is to increase the likelihood of transferring
some of the MNC's fum-specific advantages over to domestic firms for the
development of local entrepreneurial capability and to reduce the costs of imports. The
structure of the industry usually determines the nation-state' s reliance on MNCs with
regard to global integration. The nation-states will, in many cases, be dependent on
MNCs with highly integrated systems of technology, capital and managerial expertise.
On the other hand, MNCs have complex economic calculations to make regarding their
optimal location for production sites. Increased global competition limits the number of
businesses and markets that can be financed and managed effectively. The assessment
of an MNC's bargaining strength rests on a combination of its product and territorial
importance. The technological intensity, the rate of product innovation, the managerial
complexities of the enterprise and its export potential all increase the MNC's bargaining
power in relation to the nation-state. In general, it can be concluded that the
sophistication of the MNC's firm-specific advantages places it in a stronger bargaining
position vis-a-vis developing countries that require these capabilities for economic
development.
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To illustrate how MNCs have used their power in bargaining with nation-states this
assignment focused on the privatisation of telecommunications in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Most developing countries have liberalised their investment frameworks to attract FDI.
Africa, however, remains marginalised in FDI receipts. This is mainly due to failure to
improve human and technological infrastructure, small markets with poor growth
prospects, weak institutional frameworks and economic and political instability. After
independence, most African states' relied on the principle of economic self-reliance and
large public enterprises to promote development. These inwardly focused economic
policies failed by the 1980s to stimulate satisfactory economic growth and the rising
domestic and external debt problems were unserviceable. State-owned public
enterprises were characterised by overstaffing, poor financial performance and an
inability to provide a sustainable service provision. As part of the structural adjustment
programmes from international multilateral institutions and other creditor nations,
Africa was, in part, required to privatise inefficient SOEs. A significant percentage of
the increased FDI to Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s was the result of privatisation
programmes. The telecommunications industry is particularly dynamic in this respect,
because of its historically poor service provision and. the crucial need for new
information and telecommunications technologies in the globalised economy. It was the
sector that most easily attracted FDI from MNCs with advanced technologies.
The principal objective of the host country in bargaining is to change the institutional
relationship of SOEs by transferring its operation from governmental control to the
private sector. Public managers of SOEs often have conflicting objectives because of
political considerations, thereby reducing the incentive to operate efficient public
enterprises. By transferring operations to the private sector, managers have an incentive
to increase the efficiency of investment, management and operation, or to be put out of
business. Profitable enterprises also reduce public expenditure and indebtedness due to
the huge revenues earned from divestiture and predictable income. Empirical research
has shown the necessity of having regulatory agencies and privatisation laws in place to
ensure the success óf the privatisation process. The objective for MNCs in
telecommunications is clearly the maximisation of returns from their technological
capabilities. Privatised telecommunications markets in Africa have great potential for
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increased market share coupled to the likely government incentive of an exclusivity
period limiting competition initially. MNCs do not only increase market share by
extending networks to areas with no phones, but also by increasing the range of services
supplied to existing customers.
Many research studies in privatisation undertaken by developing countries and in SSA
have shown that the private sector is able to provide better services than the public
sector. The private sector's technical and managerial expertise, combined with cost
covering pricing policies and better financial discipline, provide more resources for
expanding infrastructure, including better coverage of poor households, than publicly
owned utilities. Newly privati sed firms exhibit significant increases in profitability,
operating efficiency, capital spending, real sales, total employment and dividends. In
the telecommunications industry, empirical research has shown that the introduction of
competition increased employment levels since increased investment requires more
labour; contrary to the often-cited concern of organised labour that privatisation leads to
job losses. However, the introduction of competition without regulatory supervision
does not increase service expansion since there is no reason for the competing firms to
desist from monopolistic and uncompetitive practices. Once there is a strong regulator
in place to manage competition; investment, network expansion and labour productivity
increase and real prices decrease. Therefore, the case of privatised telecommunications
in SSA illustrates that the host nation has much to gain from bargaining and attracting
MNCs to set up operations locally.
Nation-states seek increased economic activity by creating a favourable investment
environment to attract FDI and its associated capital and knowledge transfers from
MNCs. This can be accomplished through macroeconomic stability, an enabling
regulatory environment and the upgrading of infrastructure, which is important for
operational efficiency and profitability in a country. MNCs control firm-specific
advantages that nation-states require for wealth-creating production. This results in new
forms of collaboration between MNCs and nation-states. The factors of production of
the nation-state are immobile while those of MNCs are mobile and often more
developed.
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Appendix A: MNC participation in Sub-Saharan Africa telecommunications (Source: World Bank Rapid Response Unit Infrastructure Project database)
Financial
MN~Hollle MNCeuuity Total Private
Qmrurx Closure Project Name Related Names Mili Il Q~eralors Main Sl2Qnsors Segment Type of 1'1'1 SubtïJl!; of 1'1'1
Investment
USD Million
Yl!arof%
Year
Country percentage percentage ~ Private
Angola 2001 Angola Unite! Unitel Portugal Tc leeont Portugal 25 75 Mobile access Greenfield Build. own, and 2001·2002 75.3 2002
~project operate
Benin 2000 Libercom Benin Titan Titan USA 50 100 Mobile ilCCCSS Greenfield Build. own, end 2000-2000 60 2000
i!,rojcct transfer
Benin 2000 Telceel Benin Oraseem Egypt 80 ... Mobile access Greenfield Build. own, and 2000-2000 30.4 ...
project operate
Botswana. 1998 Milscom Wireless Portugal Telecom Portugal Telecom Portugal 51 100 Mobile access Greenfield Build. own. and 1998-1998 40 1998
~rojcct operate
Botswana 1998 ViSI3 Cellular France Telecom France Telecom France 51 100 Mobile access Greenfield Build. own, and 1998-1998 40 1998
reieet opemte
Burkina Faso 2000 Celtel Burkina Faso Celtel Burkina MSI MSI Netherlands 100 100 Mobile access Greenfield Build, own, and 2000-2002 28.6 2001
~rojccl transfer
Burkina Faso 2000 Tetecel Peso Tetecel International Oraseem Egypt 80 100 Mobile access Greenfield Build. own, and 2000-2000 8 2000
project operate
Burundi 2000 Africel Mauritius Telecom Mauritius Telecom Mauritius ... 100 Mobile access Greenfield Build. own. and 2000-2000 0.2 2000
project operure
Burundi 2000 Spacerci Burundi Spucetel Spacetcl UK 100 100 Mobile access Greenfield Build. own. and 2000-20{)() 0.2 2000
project operate
Burundi 1993 Tclecel Burundi Oraseem Oraseem Egypt 80 100 Mobile access Greenfield Build. own. and 199:1-2000 15.7 2000
project operate
Cameroon 2000 MTN Cameroon Camtel-Mobile MTN South Africa 70 100 Mobile access Divestiture full 2000-2001 234 2001
Cameroon 1999 Societe Camerouuaise de Mobilis.Omnge France Telecom France Telecom France 90 100 Mobile access Grccnfiekl Build. own, and
.. --1999-2001 32.1 2001
Mobiles (SCM) _~ct operate
Cape Verde 1995 Cabo Verde Telecom Portugal Telecom Portugal Telecom Portugal 40 40 Fixed access. mobile Divestiture Partial 1995-1995 20
-1995
access, and long
distance
Central African 1995 Socite Ccmrafricaine de SOCATEL France Telecom France 40 Fixed access and long Divestiture Panlal 1995-1995 1995
Republic Telecommunications distance
(SOCATEL) . -- -;:-c-_·
Central African 1995 Telecel-Central African Caratel Oraseem Oraseem Egypt 100 100 Mobile access Greenfield Build, own, and 1995-1995 1,1 1995
Republic Republic emject operate
Ch,," 2000 Libertis Chad 0ra.5COI11 Oraseem Egypt 100 Mobile access Greenfield Build. own, and 2000-2000 .. ...
project operate
Ch"d 1999 MSI Chad Telecom Celtel Chad, Cehel MSI MSI Netherlands 100 100 Mobi le access Greenfield Build, own, and 1999-2002 13 2001
Tch,d Chad Telecom Plus ~rojcct ~~atc
Congo, Deru. Rep. 1999 Celtel DRC MSIZai.-e MSI Orton Investment Netherlands 100 100 Mob; Ie access Greenfield Build. own, and 1999-2002 77.7 2001
Holdings Limited project eperate
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2002 Comccll Cinergy Corp Small local investors Mobi le access Greenfield Build. own, and 2002-2002
~ct operate
Congo. Dem. Rep. 2000 S3it Telecom SPRL SAlT Telecom Oraseem Egypt 100 Mobile 3CCCSS Greenfield Build. own, and 2000-2001 40 2001
projcct operate .-
Congo. Dcm. Rep. 1998 Vodacom DR Congo Congo Wireless Vodacom Vodacom South Africa 65 100 Mobi le access Greenfield Build. own: and 1998-2002 252 - 2002 -
Congo Wireless project operate
Network
Congo, Rep. 1999 Cehel Congo SA MSI MSI Netherlands 87 100 Mobile access Greenfield Build. own, and 1999-2002 41.4 2001
Gestilac ~rojcct transfer
Congo. Rep. 1995 Cyrus Telccommunicauons Cyrtel France Telecom prance Telecom France 70. Mobile access Greenfield Build. own. and 1995-1995 4.6 1995
SA Investccm Holding UK ... roject operate
Congo, Rep. 2000 Libertis Congo Oraseem Egypt 65 67 Mobile access Greenfield Build. own, and 2000-2001 28 1997
project operate
Congo. Rep. 1997 Societe d'Exploitation de Atlantic Tele-Network Atlantic TeJe-Nelwork USA ... ... Fixed access and long Divestiture Partial 1997-1997 42.5
Telecoms distance
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Appendix A: MNC participation in Sub-Saharan Africa telecommunications (Source: World Bank Rapid Response Unit Infrastructure Project database)
Financial
MNCHome MNCeguity Total Private Investment Yearof%
Country Closure Project Name Related Names Main Oll£rators Main Sg:Qnsors Segment Type or 1'1'1 Subtil2£ or PPI US)) Million
Year ~ percentage perccntnge Years Private
COle d'ivoire 1997 Com Cellular SA Comstar. Cora de Western Wireless Western Wireless USA 100 Mobi le access Greenfield Build, own, and 1997-2001 39 2001
Comstar lntcmational International [project operale
Cêre d'Ivoire 1997 COle D'lvoire Telecom Cl Telecom France Telecom France Telecom France 46 51 Fixed ilCCCSS and long Divestiture Partial 1997-1998 665 1998
distance
Cole d'Ivoire 1997 Loieny- Telecom Telecel Loteny Oraseem Orascom Egypt 52 80 Mobile access Greenfield Build. own, 311(1 1997-2000 65.3 2000
Access Telecom [projCCl operate
COle d'lvoire 1996 Societe Ivoirienne de Ivoiris France Telecom France Telecom france 7J 100 Mobi Ie access Greenfield Build. own. and 1996-2000 58,1 2000
Mobile (SIM) ~roject operate
Equatorial Guinea 2000 Getesa Ecumor France Telecom France Telecom France 40 40 Mobile access Greenfield Build. own. and 2000-2000 .. 2000
IprojecI operate
Eritrea 2001 Eritrea Ericel Apache Corporation Ubombo 50 Mobi le access Greenfield Build. own. and 2001-2001 40 2001
project operate
Gabon 1999 Celtel Gabon Mobile Systems MSI MSI Netherlands 80 100 Mobi le access Greenfield Build, own. and 1999-2002 29 2001
Intemmlonn! Gabon Contacts project operate
Cellular Investment
Gabon 1999 Telccel Gabon Telecel Intcmcrional Teleccl International 100 Mobile access Greenfield Build. own. and 1999-1999 6 1999
[project operate
Gambia. The 2001 Africell Gambia Linlel 100 Mobile access Greenfield Build. own, and 2001-2001 6.6 2001
TO'eCI operate
Ghana 1997 ACG Telesystems (Westel) Weslei Western Wireless Weslem Wireless USA 56 66 Fixed access and long Greenfield Build. own, and 1997-1998 12.1 1998
International distance project operate
Adesemi Nigeria. 10
Communications
International
Ghana 1996 Capital Telecom Capital Telecom Capital Telecom 100 Fixed access Greenfield Build, own, and 1996-1996 32 1996
[project operare
Ghana 1995 Celltel Ghana Schelle Cellular Group Hutchison Wharnpoa USA '" 100 Mobile access Greenfield Build, own. and 1995-1995 5 1995
(USA) LId Hong KOI~g 80 _lpmjecl operate
Ghana 1996 Ghana Telecom Telekom Malaysia Telecom Malaysia Malaysia 30 30 Fixed access and long Divestiture Partial 1996-1996 388 1996
distance
I992-199ï-Ghana 1992 Mobitel Ghana Millicom (Ghana) Millicom International Millicom International USA 80 100 Fixed and mobile Greenfield Build. own. and 20 1992
Limited Cellular access projecI __ operate
Ghana 1996 Scancom Spacefon Irtvesteem Holdings Investcom Holding UK 100 100 Mobile access Greenfield Build. own, and 1996-1996 4 1996
(commercial brand) project operate
Guinea 1997 Intercel Guinee Telceel Guinee Small local investors 100 Mobile access Greenfield Build, own. and 1997-1997 2 1997
I [project operate._- .. . _ ..
~Óciele des
-
Guinea 1995 Telekom Malaysia Telecom Mnlaysia Malaysia ..- óO Fixed access. mobile Divestiture Partial 1995-1998 118.3 1998
Telecommunications de access. and long
Guinee (Sotelguil distance
Guinea 1997 Spacetel Guinee Investcorn Holding lnvestcorn Holding UK 100 100 Mobile access Greenfield Build. own, and 1997-1997 1997
project operate
Kenya 1999 Kenccll Vivendi Vivendi France 60 100 Mobile access Greenfield Build. own. and 1999-1999 55 1999
Sameer Investments project operate -
Kenya 1999 Safaricom Vodafone Vodafone pic UK 40 40 Mobile access Greenfield Build. own, and 1999-2000 52 2000
Telkom Kenyn ~ct operate
Lesotho 2001 Telecom Lesotho Mountain Kingdom Econet Wireless Lid Nigeria 70 Fixed access, mobile Divestiture Partial 2001-2001 17 2001
Communications Eskom access. and long
Mauritius Telecom distance
Lesotho 1996 Vodacom Lesotho Limited Vodafone Vodacom South Africa 88 100 Mobile access Greenfield Build. own. and 1996-2000 165 2000
(VCL) Sekhc-Metsi [project operate
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Financial
MNCHolllc MNCcguity Total Private Investment YCIlTof%~ Closure Project Name Related Names Main Ol2£falors Main S(K2:nsors Segment Tvnc orpPI Subt~orpPI USDMiliion
Year Country percentage percentage Years Private
Madagascar 1997 Madacom Distacom (HK) Distaccm 100 Mobile access Greenfield Build. own, and 1997-1997 10 1997
.~ opemie
Madagascar 1997 Socci Samen Cellular Lilyan Holdings Bethad Lityan Holdings Berhad 100 Mobile access Greenfield Build. own, and 1997-1997 0.1 1997
project operate
Madagascar 1998 SMMAntaris Societe Malguche France Telecom France Telecom France 35 100 Mobile access Greenfield Merchant 1998-1998 1998
de Mobiles project
Madagascar 1994 Telceel Madagascar Oraseem Oraseem Egypt 100 Mobile access Greenfield Build, own, and 1994-1994 5 1994
project operate
Malawi 1999 Celtel Limited Malawi MSI MSI Netherlands 80 100 Mobile access Greenfield Build. own. and 1999-~00~ 15.1 ~OOI
project operate
Malawi 1995 Telekom Networks Malawi TNM Tetekom Malaysia Telecom Malaysia Malaysia 60 Mobile access Greenfield Build. own. and 1995-1999 18.4 1999
project operate
Moli 2002 Ik",el M.li Ikatel SA France Telecom france 100 Mobi Ie access Greenfield Build. own. and 2002-~00~ 42.7 2002
rojeer operate
Mauritania 2000 Maurirano- Tunisiennc de Somatel 100 Mobile access .Greenfleld Build. own. and 2000-2001 51.6 2001
Telecommunications SA project operate
(Manel) ---_._---
Mauritania 2001 Mauritel Compagnie Maroc Telecom 54 Fixed nccess, mobile Divestiture
-_._--- .- 48--Partial ~001-2001 ~OOI
Mnuritanlenne des access. and long
Telecommunications distance
Mauritius 2001 Mauritius Telecom Cellplus (Cellular) France Telecom France Telecom france 100 100 Fixed access. mobile Divestiture Partial ::WOI-2002 365.6 2001
access. and long
distance ---_.-,-
Vodacom International Vodacom South Arden 100 Mobile access Greenfield
------ ------ j-----
Mauritius Build. own. and
project operate
'J997-~ ~- ----Mozambique 1997 Telccomunicacoes Meveis Mcel Deutsche Telecom Deutsche Telecom Gcnnany 24 26 Mobile access Greenfield Build. own. and 1999
de Mocambique (1MV, project operate
Mozambique 2002 Vodacom Mozambique Vodacom South Africa 100 100 Mobile access and long Greenfield Build. own. and ;!OO2-2002 15 2002
distance Iproject transfer
Namibia. 1995 Mobile Telio Sewdfund International Sweden ~3 49 Mobile access Greenfield Build. own. and 1995-1998 22 1998
Telecommunications project operate
(Namibia) -----
Niger 2000 Cehel Niger MSI MSI Netherlands 70 100 Mobi Ie access Greenfield Build. own. and 2000-2002 16.7 2001
Iproject operate
----=:---
Niger 2001 Sonhel Gayatri Projects Ltd. ZTE China 51 Fixed access and long Divestiture Partial 2001-2001 30.2 200'
distance ------ --------
Mobile access
-----
Niger 2000 Telceel Niger Telecel International Ornscom Egypt 100 100 Greenfield Build. own. and 2ooo-~000 5.8 2000
~roject operate
Nigeria 2001 Celleem Kalyani Group Celleem 100 Fixed and mobile Greenfield Build. own. and 2002-2002 14 2002
access project operate
Nigeria. 2001 Econet Wireless Nigeria EWN Beonet Wireless Econer Wireless 65 Mobile access Greenfield Build. own, and 2001-2001 565 2001
Limited Limited reieet operate
Nigeria 1998 EM International Systems EM Intemntionnl 100 fixed access Greenfield Build. own, und 1998-2000 20.6 2000
Systems [project operate
Nigeria 1998 Intercellular Intercellular 100 Fixed access Greenfield Build. own. and 1998-2000 40.1 2000
project operate -- -
Nigeria 1992 Mobile Digital Communication Digital Communiearlon USA 55 55 Mobile access Greenfield Build. own. and 1992-2001 I 2001
Telecommunications Limited Limited project operate
Services Limited (MTS)
Nigeria 2001 MTN Nigeria MTN MTN South Africa 79 100 Mobile access Greenfield Build. own. and 2001-2001 285 2001
reieet operate
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Finnncial
MNCHome MNCcguiLy Totril Private Investment Ycafof%~ Closure Project Name Rclat~d Nam~s Main OpcralQI'S Main Suonsors Segment Type ofPPI Suhtyng of PPJ !JSDMillion
Year ~ percentage ncrcentage YCill1i Private
Nigeria 1997 Multilinks Kension Investment Kenston Investment 100 Fixed access Greenfield Build. own. and 1997-2000 57 2000
[project operate
Rwanda 1998 Rwandaccll MlN MTN South Africa 31 50 Mobile access Greenfield Build. own. and 1998-2001 15.6 2001
~rojccl operate
Senegal 1998 Seniel GSM Millicom lruemarlonal Millicom International USA 75 100 Mobi le access Greenfield Build. own, and 1998-1998 1998
Cellular [project operate
Senegal 1997 Societe Nationale des Sonarel. Alize france Telecom Prance Telecom France 42 60 Fixed access. mobile Divestiture Partial 1997-2001 406.8 2001
Telcconununications du access, and long
Senegal t Sonatel) distance -
Seychelles 1995 Cable and Wireless Cable and Wireless Cable and Wireless USA 100 100 Mobi le access Greenfield Build. own, and 1995-1995 1995
Seychelles project o.perale
Seychelles 1997 Telecom Seychelles Ltd. Airtel Bharti Enterprises Bhani Enterprises 100 Fixed access. mobile Greenfield Build. own, and 1997-1997 25 1997
access, and long project operate
distance
Sierra Leone 1998 Cehel Sierra Leone MSI. Pen hurst MSI Netherlands 100 100 Mobile :1CCCSS Greenfield Build. own. and 1998-2002 17 2001
Investment Group [project operate
Sierra Leone 2000 Mie Sicnil leone Mobilel_ Millicom Millicom International Millicom International USA 70 100 Mobile access Greenfield Build. own. and 2000-2001 6.5 2001
Sierra Leone Cellular I project operate
Somalia 2000 Barakaal Hormud Small local investors 100 Mobi le access Greenfield Build. own, and 2000-2002 2 2002
rojeer operate
Somalia 1998 BOS3S0 Somalia Bosaso Somalia Bosaso Somalia 100 Fixed access Greenfield Merchant 1998-1998 .. 1998
project
Somalia 1997 Gafkom Somalia Galkacayo Telecom Galkoeavo Telecom 100 Fixed access and long Greenfield Merchant 1997-1997 1997
Corporal ion Corporation distance [project
Somalia 2001 Nationlink ... Fixed and mobile Greenfield Build, own. and 2001-2001 ...
access reject operate
Somalia 1998 Netco Somalia North Eastern North Eastern USA ... 100 Fixed access Greenfield Merchant 1998-1998 1998
Telecommunication Telecommunications project
s Company Co.
Sornnlia 2001 Telecom Somalia ... _ .. ... Fi xed access Greenfield Build. own. and 2001-2001 ...
project ~r.lIe ___ ----
Somalia 2001 Tclsom Mobile Somatel ... Mobi le access Greenfield Build. own, and 2001-2001 ...
~I operate
South Africa 2001 CellC Saudi Oger Saudi Ogcr Saudi Arabia 60 100 Mobile access Greenfield Build. own. and 2001-2001 220 2001
Cellsar (?roject operate
Sooth Africa 1993 Mobile MlNGroup Johnic Limited Domestic ... 96 Mobile access Greenfield Build. own. and 1994-2002 2.034 2002
Telecommunications project operate
Nelwork (MTN)
South Africa 1997 Telkom SA Southwestern Bell SBC Communtcanons USA 18 ~~ Fixed access and long Divestiture Partial 1997-2002 6.498 2002
Internmionnl Holdings Telecom Malaysia Malaysia ID distance
(SBC)
South Africa 1994 Vodacom vodafone vedafone UK 35 85 Mobile access Greenfield Build. own. and 1994-2002 2.976 2002
Telkom South Africa [!roject operate -~
Sudan 1996 Mobilel Sudan MSI MSI Netherlands 39 W Mobile access Greenfield Build, own. and 1996-1996 1996
[!rojcct operate
Sudan 1992 Sudatel Sudalcl Local companies Domestic 35 Fixed access and long Divestiture Partial 1992-1992 .. 1992
distance
Swaziland 1998 MTN Swaziland MTN MTN South Africn 3D 30 Mobile access Greenfield Build. own, and 1998-2002 33.6 2002
[project - operate ------- ----
Tanzania 1996 ACG Telesystems - African African USA _.- 100 Fixed access Greenfield Build. own. and 1996-1998 8 1998
Tanzania Communications Group Communications Group project operate
(US based)
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Fjnanci~1
MNC Home MNC equity Total Private Investment Ycarof%
Country Closure Project Name Rclat!.?~1Narnes Main O~mtors' Main SUQnsors Segment Type ofPPI Sub'YJ?Cof PPI USDMillion
Year
Country percentage pcrcenlae.c Years Private
Tanzania 1996 Jupiter Communications Equity Investment Equity Investment 100 Fixed access Greenfield Build. own. and 1996·1996 0.2 1996
Menugement Management -roiecr operate
Tanzania 1993 Mobile! Tanzania MIe Tanzania. Millicom International Millicom International USA 75 75 Fixed and mobile Greenfield Build. own. and 1994-2002 335 1999
Adésemi Ccllul.,. access project Opcl1HC
Cornnumications
Imcmational
Tanzania 2001 Tanzanian TTCL Deutsche Telecom. Deutsche Telecom Germany ... 35 Fixed access. mobile Divestiture Partial 2001·2001 182.5 2001
Telecommunications MSI Netherlands ... access. and long
Company Limited distance --.
Tanzania 1995 Tritel Telecommunications TRI Tecbnology Resources Malaysia ... 100 Mobile access Greenfield Build. own. and 1995·1995 2S 1995
Telecomnumications Industries project operale
(Malaysia)
Tanzania 1999 Vodacom Tanzania Vodacom Vodafone South Africa 65 100 Mobile access Greenfield Build. own. and 1999·2001 99.9 2001
I pro ice' transfer
Tanzania 1997 Zanzibar Telecom Limited ZANTEL Emirates Telecom Emirates Telecom UAE ... 82 Mobile access Greenfield Build. own. and 1997-1997 2 1997
Corporation. Mecca Corporation project transfer
International
Oraseem Oraseem Egypt 100 Mobile access Greenfield Build. own. and 1999·1999
._-_.-
1999Togo 1999 Tcleccl Togo ... 5
[project operate
Uganda 1994 Glovergem Celtcl Limited Celtel Limited MSJ MSJ Netherlands 89 100 Mobile access Greenfield Build. own. and 1994-2002 39.2 2001
Uganda Convergem AG project operate
Uganda 1998 MTN Uganda MTN MTN South Africa 52 100 Fixed and mob! le Greenfield Build. own. and 1998·2001 140.2 2001
access [project operate
Uganda 1999 Uganda UTL Tclceel Oraseem Ikwezi Group Egyp' 51 Fixed access. mobile Divestiture Partial 1999·1999 33.5 1999
Telecommunications access. and long
Limited distance
Zambia 1997 Telecel Zambia Oraseem Oraseem Egypt ... 100 Mobile access Greenfield Build. OW11. and 1997·2000 :!I.:! 2000
project operate
Zambia 1998 Zamcell Celtel Zambia MSJ MSI Netherlands 80 100 Mobile access Greenfield Build. own. and 1998·2002 35.7 2002
Mitsui Mitsui [project transfer
Zimbabwe 1998 Econet T.S. Masiyiwa 100 Mobile access Greenfield Build. own. and 1998·1998 25 1998
project operate
Zimbabwe 1998 Telceel Zimbabwe Oraseem Oraseem Egypt 60 100 Mobi Ie access Greenfield Build. own. and 1998·1998 21 1998
[project operate
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